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ABSTRACT
Traditional Revenue Management systems were developed to maximize airlines'
revenues in restricted fare product environments, based on the assumption of
independence of demand by fare class. With the rapid emergence of low-cost carriers
in various parts of the world, the pricing environments have changed. The network
carriers have had to deal with undifferentiated fare structures, for which demand for
each fare class can no longer be assumed to be independent, given that customers
systematically buy the lowest fare available in the absence of distinctions between
fare products. In these fare structures, traditional Revenue Management systems
lead to a "spiral down" of revenues.
The first goal of this thesis is to present two alternatives that address the problem
described above, allowing airlines to partially recover from the decrease in revenue
which occurs when an airline removes the restrictions in its fare structure. These
alternatives are designed for implementation into O&D-Control - or network Revenue
Management - methods. The alternative methods are based on the sell-up
probability, which is the probability that a passenger is willing to buy a higher-fare
ticket in case his/her request is denied. One of the methods ("Q-Forecasting")
modifies the forecaster by estimating the demand based on the probability of sell-up,
while the other ("Fare Adjustment") acts at the booking limit optimizer level,
accounting again for the sell-up potential. We focus in this thesis on explaining the
processes and mechanisms involved in these two methods, how they are linked and
complement each other, but also on their performances based on a simulator which
allows us to observe the impact of each method under various characteristics of the
booking process.
Thesis Advisor: Dr Peter P. Belobaba
Title: Principal Research Scientist, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this thesis is to present and evaluate the performance of recently
developed methods for adapting traditional Revenue Management algorithms to less
restricted fare structures. Since the end of the 1970's, airlines across the world have
developed more and more sophisticated Revenue Management methods to optimize
the seat inventory control and therefore maximize their revenue. These airlines
based their Revenue Management algorithms on strong assumptions, such as
segmentation by price differentiation and independence of demand and behavior by
passenger types. The segmentation was achieved by selling the same seat at
different fares depending on associated advance purchase requirements and
restrictions - Saturday night stay, change fees and non-refundability of ticket.
These assumptions are now more and more violated, because of the change in
consumer behavior, the emergence of the low-cost carriers and the dramatic drop in
demand which was seen after the events of September 11, 2001. The traditional
carriers are facing new challenges - erosion of differences between passenger types,
change in fare products - and are looking for new methods in order to adapt their
algorithms to these new demand patterns and new competitors. We will simulate in
this thesis the possible revenue gains that can be achieved by implementing two
different Revenue Management alternatives in less restricted fare structures.
The simulation will use the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS)
developed at the Boeing Company by Hopperstad to simulate as accurately as
possible the booking process of an airline in a competitive environment, with various
levels of control over the passenger choice model, the environment and the airline
Revenue Management methods settings.
1.1. Revenue Management
Revenue Management was born in the 1970s and was at first known as Yield
Management (YM). Yield refers to the average fare per passenger mile. Therefore,
yield management methods were logically intended to capture as many high yield
passengers as possible.
Before the deregulation of the US airline industry in 1978, airline companies had no
control over fares, which were determined by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) on a
per-mile basis. The board allowed for fare increases to compensate for operating
costs and in case of losses. This led to relatively high fares, and a good level of
service for those who could afford it, but revenues and loads remained low.
Starting from deregulation, the airline companies entered a competitive
environment, and yield management became more and more crucial. The goal for
each of them was (and still is) to increase revenue and decrease costs, of course.
The airline companies compete on an OD basis, meaning that passengers choose
between airlines and products on a city-pair, composed of an Origin and a
Destination, generally independent from the itinerary flown in between.
Consequently, fares no longer depend on distance, but vary with respect to the OD
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market. In order to maximize revenues, the theoretical optimal strategy for airlines
is to charge passengers at their maximum Willingness-To-Pay (WTP). In practice,
this is difficult to achieve, that is why revenue management was developed, starting
from the differential pricing and overbooking strategies initially introduced before
deregulation.
Yield Management has been developed over the last 30 years to achieve these goals
and has reached high levels of complexity to deal with complicated fare structures
established by the pricing departments in each company. The aim of Yield
Management remained to attract as many high yield passengers as possible while
filling the aircraft and avoiding flying empty seats.
The segmentation was based on restrictions (or fare fences) such as advance
purchase requirements, Saturday night stay, round trip purchase requirement, and
non or partial refundability. But the complication lies in the arrival process: high yield
passengers book late, whereas leisure passengers (lower willingness-to-pay) book
early; Revenue Management has therefore to find a means to separate both
behaviors. In order to satisfy the two goals described above, an accurate forecast of
high yield demand is needed. Then, based on these forecasts, Revenue Management
practices are designed to optimize the allocation of seats to a specific fare class with
its associated restrictions.
Today, the level of complexity is even higher, and many different seat allocation
algorithms have been developed, either flight-leg based or OD-based (most recently
developed). We will describe these methods in more detail in the next chapters.
Demand forecasting and seat allocation optimization, the two main aspects of
Revenue Management, rely strongly on mathematical formulas and modeling
approaches. These modeling approaches are changing and this thesis will deal with
changes in both aspects of Revenue Management.
1.2. Changes in Airline Industry and Market Structure
Along with the increasing complexity of Revenue Management Methods, the
emergence of new air service providers has changed the industry. Unlike the legacy
carriers, the low-fare carriers have very low costs although they provide similar
services at lower fares. And their strategy appears to be quite successful at this
point, as they were among the only companies of the US airline industry to achieve a
positive profit at the beginning of 2005 (JetBlue, Southwest and America West).
The most visible characteristic of the low-cost carriers compared to the legacy
carriers is their simplified fare structure, with very few restrictions or advance
purchase requirements. This means that they do not segment demand as much as
their competitors. From the consumer point of view, there is a lower number of
products offered by the low-cost carriers, but their prices change as we approach the
departure date, whereas in the case of a legacy carrier, the consumer has to choose
between different fare products (with distinct restrictions and advance purchase
requirements for each fare product).
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In the markets where the legacy carriers compete with low-cost carriers, the former
have no other choice than matching their competitors to avoid losing too much
revenue. They dramatically change their fare products, which means compression of
fare ratios and total or partial removal of restrictions and advance purchase
requirements. In these new kinds of environments, where the fundamental
assumption of traditional Revenue Management - independence of demand by fare
class - is violated since there is no longer the possibility to segment the demand, the
traditional Revenue Management methods do not perform as well as they used to in
restricted environements. As we will see, without any restrictions or advance
purchase requirements, the traditional Revenue Management algorithms lead to a
"spiral down" effect, and revenues drop very fast. Given the quick expansion of the
low-cost carriers, there is today a pressing need for developing new algorithms which
can provide an optimal seat inventory control even in these cases.
1.3. Recently Developed New Approaches
From this point forward, we will focus on the cases where the fences - restrictions
and advance purchase requirements - have been removed in a series of markets for
a given network carrier. We will deal with unrestricted fare product structures,
without restrictions or advance purchase requirements.
1.3.1. Forecasting and Sell-up
Forecasting is based on historical data: it is the estimation by fare class and by flight
of the unconstrained demand, obtained from the record of the booking process of
previous "equivalent" flights - previous Fridays for instance if we try to forecast
demand for a future Friday. Forecasts should be as accurate as possible, since it is a
crucial step in the process of Revenue Management. In the unrestricted fare product
structure, since every passenger is going to buy the lowest fare available (given that
there is no distinction between products anymore), it becomes impossible to
estimate, based on historical data, a demand for each fare class using traditional
methods. When nothing allows us to distinguish between different fare classes,
customers indeed purchase the lowest available fare and demand for highest classes
does not materialize. And if it is not observed in the historical database, no demand
can be forecast for highest fare classes in the future.
The new methods we will present later will deal, in terms of forecasting, with the
probability of sell-up, which is the probability that a passenger is willing to buy a
higher fare ticket for the same flight in case he (or she) is denied booking for the
requested fare product. Accounting for this probability in the forecast and in the
optimization process will allow more seats to be protected for higher yield
passengers and force them to sell-up when they will be denied booking for their first
request. The challenge is to know how to use these sell-up probabilities accurately,
and even more difficult, how to estimate them dynamically during the forecast
process (they depend on the flight and cannot be optimal if set arbitrarily) in order to
include them in the Revenue Management Systems (RMS).
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1.3.2. New Methods: "Q-Forecasting" and "Fare Adjustment"
In order to address the problems mentioned above, several developments have
occurred in the field of revenue management algorithms for less restricted fare
structures, by Belobaba/Hopperstad' on one hand, and by Fiig/Isler2 on the
other hand. Both of these new approaches, respectively called "Q-Forecasting" (QF)
and "Fare Adjustment" (FA) methods, have been implemented and tested in the
Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS). Each of them makes use of the
probability that a passenger is willing to buy-up at the time of booking, but each
deals with a different aspect of the problem. The first addresses the problem of
forecasting a less segmented demand in order to feed a traditional optimizer. The
second deals with adjusting the fares to incorporate the potential of sell-up into the
seat inventory control optimizer.
1.4. Goal of the Thesis
Today, the vast majority of airline companies use leg-based forecasts and
optimizers. Nevertheless, there is a slow but inevitable shift towards OD control
methods which are proven to increase significantly revenues although expensive to
implement. Moreover, many legacy airlines struggle with low-cost carriers in more
and more markets. They need to introduce some new features into their Revenue
Management Systems in order to account for the presence of low-cost carriers and
compete with these airlines in a given set of markets, while keeping traditional fare
structures and methods in other parts of their OD sets. Previous studies - Cooper
and Homen-de-Mello 3 - have shown the impact of the "do nothing" strategy in
these markets, and have explained the negative impact of traditional forecasting and
optimization when the "old" assumptions are violated.
Therefore, in this thesis, we will present and explain the new alternatives, the way
they are linked with the remainder of the Revenue Management (RM) process and
the seat inventory optimization, mainly in the context of OD control methods. It is
the goal of the thesis to present the revenue benefits obtained from the use of both
methods, initially with inputs set arbitrarily. The next step presented here, is a way
to estimate the required inputs during the forecasting process, in order to make the
alternative methods autonomous and dynamically adaptive, which is a required
feature given the level of automation reached in the Revenue Management System
(RMS) to which they will be added.
All performance evaluations will be done using the Passenger Origin-Destination
Simulator (PODS) developed by Hopperstad at the Boeing Company. The simulator
will be described in detail in Chapter 3.
BELOBABA and HOPPERSTAD, Q investigations - Algorithms for Unrestricted Fare Classes, PODS
presentation, Amsterdam, 2004
2 ISLER and FIG, SAS O&D Low Cost Project, PODS presentation, Minneapolis-St Paul, 2004
3 COOPER and HOMEN-DE-MELLO, Models for the Spiral-down effect in Revenue Management, Dec 2004
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1.5. Structure of the Thesis
The thesis consists of 3 main parts: The Literature Review, The Approach to the
Problem, and The Analysis of the Simulations.
In Chapter 2, the literature review will present more extensively the history of
Revenue Management starting from the 1978 US deregulation, going through the
increasingly sophisticated algorithms, and the revenue benefits each major
improvement achieved with respect to previously used methods. Then, we will
introduce some more detailed analysis done on the change in the airline industry due
to the emergence of the low-cost carriers in the United States, but also in other parts
of the world. We will discuss the "hybrid" legs in which different fare product
structures co-exist, and the "spiral down" effect to which the traditional RMSs lead in
unrestricted environments, explaining the need for alternative methods dealing with
these new kinds of markets.
Chapter 3 is divided into sections related to the Passenger Origin-Destination
Simulator (PODS) on one hand and sections related to the new RM methods on the
other hand. The description of PODS is more an overview than a detailed
presentation, given that the simulator has been extensively described in previous
theses. We will present the fundamental processes, their interactions, the different
Revenue Management methods we will refer to during the thesis and the specifics of
PODS with respect to the topic of this thesis, such as sell-up inputs and features.
Then come the theoretical parts, with at first a more detailed presentation of the
sell-up concept and the mechanisms it involves. Both new alternative methods are
described after that, given that they are both based on sell-up considerations. Q-
Forecasting will come first, and then we will present the Fare Adjustment methods
and their links with Q-forecasting. We will describe the methods assuming the
required inputs are known and manually set, and we will explain the estimation
processes used to dynamically compute the required inputs in the case of the Q-
Forecasting method.
In Chapter 4, the simulation results, we will analyze the performance of both
methods independently, at first without any estimation, and then using the
estimator. Finally, we will combine both Fare Adjustment and Q-Forecasting
methods. The point is to quantify the revenue benefits, but more interestingly to
focus on the mechanisms involved, analyzing the loads - network wide, or in
specified markets, looking at local and connecting passengers - fare mix, booking
curves, sell-up curves and adjusted fares.
Finally, the conclusion - Chapter 5 - will summarize the benefits obtained from both
methods in unrestricted environments and suggest directions for future work.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter first reviews the work done to this point in Revenue Management, in
traditional environments, and then presents the new kinds of environments involving
less differentiated fare product structures. The conditions corresponding to this new
kind of environments are due to the rapid expansion of low-cost carriers in America,
Asia and Europe competing with legacy carriers in a larger and larger number of
markets.
2.1. Review of Revenue Management's Traditional
Assumptions and Algorithms
Revenue Management methods deal with the problem of maximizing revenues by
optimizing the number of seats made available for each booking class (so-called
"Seat Inventory Control", SIC). This means limiting the availability for low-fare, early
bookings and simultaneously protecting enough seats for later-booking, higher fare
passengers.
The first Revenue Management systems appeared in the early 1980's, and kept
improving since that time, adding more and more sophisticated features to the seat
inventory control and optimization. They are based on strong assumptions which
remained reasonably true until recent years.
3 main techniques have been successively added to the Revenue Management
Systems (RMSs): Overbooking, Fare Class Mix and OD Control.
There are two underlying assumptions on which are based the "traditional" RMSs.
The first one is the independence of demand (mean and standard deviation) by fare
class for a given flight. This means that the forecast predicts the demand for each
fare class independently from other fare classes, based on observations of bookings
on previous flights in the same fare class. It implies that the customer is supposed
not to consider choosing between different fare classes. The second assumption is
that fare structure is determined independently from this process by the pricing
department of the airline (not described in this thesis).
Barnhart, Belobaba and Odoni 4, as well as McGill and Van Ryzin5 provide very
good summaries and descriptions of the evolution of RMS in the airline industry. As
said before, the first RMS appeared in the early 1980's, focusing on the overbooking
problem in order to increase revenue. Then, the 2 nd generation provided threshold
methods to control the inventory. Later, the 3 rd generation added the ability to
forecast and optimize by booking classes for each future flight leg departure. These
3rd generation RMSs are implemented today in the vast majority of the airline
companies across the world.
4 BARNHART, BELOBABA, ODONI, Operation Research in the Air Transportation Industry, Transportation
Science, Vol 37, No 4, Nov 2003
s McGILL and VAN RYZIN, Revenue Management: Research Overview and Prospects, Transportation
Science, Vol. 33, No. 2, May 1999
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2.1.1. Overbooking Models
Overbooking models were aimed to reduce the revenue loss due to no-shows (used
to represent 15 to 25% of total bookings at date of departure, down to 10%
nowadays). They involve booking more seats than actually available on the aircraft,
accounting for the probability of no-shows. Overbooking is a tradeoff (in terms of
risks and costs) between denied boarding (airline image) and potential revenue loss
from unsold or spoiled seats. These overbooking models include those developed by
Simon6 , Vikred7 and Rothstein, 9 .
2.1.2. Fare Class Mix Models
Some significant progress was then achieved regarding the forecasting part of
Revenue Management by Littlewood'", L'Heureux", and then further explored by
Lee 2 . The demand forecasts are then fed into a seat allocation optimizer to
determine the Booking Limits to be applied to each booking class, using serial
nesting described in Chapter 3. The idea is not to allocate seats to partitioned
classes, but instead to protect seats for higher classes (all available seats in the
entire inventory are available to highest fare class during the entire booking
process). The nested seat allocation problem has been solved by Littlewood'" for
two classes, and then extended to n classes by Belobaba" 4 . It is based on the
notion of Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (known as the EMSRb's method, which
can be defined as "the average fare of the booking class under consideration
multiplied by the probability that demand will materialize for this incremental seat"),
and uses heuristic decision rules for nested booking classes. It has become the most
commonly used SIC model among airlines' RMSs. The use of fare class mix models
allowed an increase in revenue by 2 to 4%14 with respect to judgmental methods.
Optimal formulations for the multiple nested class problem have been published by
Curry16 , Brumelle and McGill'7 , and Wollmeri.
6 SIMON, An Almost Practical Solution to Airline Overbooking, J. Transp. Econ. Policy 2, 1968
7 VIKRED, Airline Overbooking: Some Further Solutions, 3. Transp. Econ. Policy 6, 1972
" ROTHENSTEIN, An Airline Overbooking Model, Transportation Science 5, 1971
9 ROTHENSTEIN, Airline Overbooking: Fresh Approaches Needed, Transportation Science 9, 1975
10 LITTLEWOOD, Forecasting and Control of Passenger Bookings, AGIFORS, Israel, 1972
" L'HEUREUX, A New Twist in Forecasting Short-Term Passenger Pickup, AGIFORS, Bowness-On-
Windermere, 1986
" LEE, Airline Reservations Forecasting: Probabilistic and Statistical Models for the Booking Process, PhD
Thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1990
13 BELOBABA, Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory Management, PhD Thesis, MIT, Cambridge,
MA, 1987
"4 BELOBABA, Application of a Probabilistic Decision Model To Airline Seat Inventory Control, Operations
Research 37, 1989
15 BELOBABA, 1992
16 CURRY, Optimal Airline Seat Allocation with Fare Classes Nested by Origin and Destinations,
Transportation Science 24, 1990
17 BRUMELLE and McGILL, Airline Seat Allocation with Multiple Nested Fare Classes, Operations Research
41,1993
18 WOLLMER, An Airline Seat Management Model for a Single Leg Route When Lower Fare Classes Book
First, Operations Research 40, 1992
18
2.1.3. OD Control Models
The next step in the development of RMS was to account for network effects and
manage the seat inventory by the revenue of the passenger's OD itinerary (instead
of according to the fare class request on a flight leg), which became more feasible
with the improvements in computer science as the problem became more and more
complex. It was very important for airlines which operate large hub and spoke
networks. The first OD-Control RMSs used virtual nesting to map itinerary+fare type
to a (hidden) virtual class, in order to consider the network value of an ODF instead
of just its fare class. They were developed by Belobaba13 , Smith and Penn'9,
Williamson20 and Vinod2 1,2 2 . These RMSs gave preference to longer-haul,
connecting passengers with higher fares, but did not address the need in certain
cases for giving preference to two local passengers whose fares, when added, are
higher than the connecting fare. DAVN (Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting)
addressed this problem based on the Network Revenue Value, defined as the total
itinerary fare minus the revenue displacement that might occur on connecting flight
legs if the passenger's request for a multiple-leg itinerary is accepted (other than the
legs under consideration). There exist a lot of variations on these methods,
especially regarding the clustering process.
A simpler model was developed as well, called "Bid-Price Control" by Smith and
Penn", Simpson2 3 and Williamson . In this method, the OD Fare is compared to
a bid-price. The bid-price is an approximate displacement cost equal to the sum of
dual prices associated with each crossed leg in the itinerary. The dual prices come
from a deterministic LP and are used as marginal values for an incremental seat on
different legs. If the bid-price is greater than the OD Fare, the request will be denied,
if it is lower, the request will be accepted. These methods will be described more
extensively later in the thesis.
The benefits they provide have been evaluated using the Passenger Origin-
destination Simulator PODS 2 s, by Belobaba and Wilson26 , and quantified as an
increase in revenue by 4 to 6% relative to conventional leg-based fare class control.
The successive improvements in airline RMS have indeed allowed increasing revenue,
accounting for overbooking, fare class mix, and finally network effects. These
advances remained nevertheless based on strong assumptions, such as the
independence of demand by fare class, which tend to be violated frequently. This
translates generally into the inability to recover from revenue loss when competing
with a low-cost airline in a set of markets, as explained in the next sections.
'9 SMITH and PENN, Analysis of Alternative Origin-Destination Control Strategies, AGIFORS, New Seabury,
MA, 1988
20 WILLIAMSON, Comparison of Optimization techniques for Origin-Destination Seat Inventory Control,
Master's Thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1988
21 vINOD, A set Partitioning Algorithm for Virtual Nesting Indexing Using Dynamic Programming, Internal
Technical Report, SABRE Decision Technologies, 1989
22 VINOD, Origin and Destination Yield Management, in The Handbook of Airline Economics, D. Jenkins
(ed.), The Aviation weekly Group of the McGraw-Hill companies, New York, New York, 1995
23 SIMPSON, Using Network Flow Techniques to Find Shadow Prices for Market and Seat Inventory Control,
Memorandum M89-1, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1989
24 WILLIAMSON, Airline Network Seat Inventory Control: Methodologies and Revenue Impacts, PhD
Thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1992
25 Boeing PODS, developed by Hopperstad, Berge and Filipowski, 1997
26 BELOBABA and WILSON, Impact of Yield Management in Competitive Airline Markets, Journal of Air
Transportation Management 3, 1997
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2.2. The Low-Cost Carrier Model
Although the low-cost carriers have existed for decades (Southwest Airlines was
founded in 1971), it is only since the beginning of the new century that this kind of
airline companies has significantly developed in the US, and also in Europe (Easy Jet,
Ryanair), Asia (Air Asia, Tiger) and Oceania (Virgin Blue, Jet Star). Low-cost carriers
carry now more than 25% of the domestic passengers in the US.
The effects of the LCC emergence have dramatically changed the airline industry
landscape in the world. The main characteristic of these airlines - apart from their
very low costs, is their simple fare/restriction product structure, that the legacy
carriers are forced to match to avoid losing their market share. But this causes
significant drops in revenues due to the fact that the legacy carriers have higher
operating costs and their RMSs are based on the restrictions and advance purchase
requirements features. As we will discuss later, the legacy carriers face a spiral down
effect in their revenues in the attacked markets when restrictions are removed.
Weber and Thie127 have presented an analysis of the "Methodological Issues in
Low-Cost Carriers Revenue Management", from which I summarize the main points
of the comparison between LCC and legacy carriers:
Low-Cost Carriers
/Single product: no segmentation
/1 way fares only
'/No connecting traffic
'/No refund of cancelled tickets
'/Single product offered at different fares
./Booking (bkg) control via fares offered
/Only 1 fare available at a time
,/Demand supposedly price-sensitive
'/Time series based forecast does not
reflect price elasticity
/ RM mainly manual or semi-automatic
Legacy Carriers
'/Multiple product; segmented
,/Mainly return fares
'/Mainly network traffic
'/Refundable ticket depending on fare
/Fare differentiation according to
product differentiation
'/Bkg control via booking class available
'/Several fare products available at a
time
'/Demand supposedly product-sensitive
'/Time series based forecast dominates
Revenue Management
/ RM control by fully automatic systems
Of course, all low-cost carriers do not fit exactly in the first column, and there is a
very large range of models between the two extremes described above.
But from this, we can point out the number of non-negligible differences between
both models. Nevertheless, there are also some points which apply to both low-cost
and legacy carriers:
/ The average fare increases as we approach the departure date
/ The low amount of revenue obtained from the lowest fare classes
27 WEBER and THIEL, Methodological Issues in Low-Cost Carriers Revenue Management, Presentation to
AGIFORS, Auckland, New Zealand, Jan 2004
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Dunleavy and Westerman 28 provide also a good analysis of the low-cost carrier
model compared with the legacy carrier model. They point out the complexity
problem the legacy carriers' RM departments have to face regarding the finer and
finer segmentation of demand (caused by pricing strategies); whereas in the case of
low-cost carriers, a simple single product is offered at a unique price which changes
depending only on how close the day-of-departure is to the day-of-booking. Using
their advantages - lower costs since they started operations, and avoidance of
competition with other LCCs - the low-cost carrier model provides sustainable
profitability to these airlines - at least in a short term.
The point is that both models have to co-exist on the same legs, and inevitably, each
of them has to incorporate a significant part of the competitor's model in its own
model. The low-cost carriers may need some less simple RMS, as well as legacy
carriers need to extend their RMS by adding some features allowing them to address
the presence of LCCs in some of their markets. We will, in this thesis, focus on the
second part.
Along with the emergence of low-cost carriers, a new segregation of demand has
arisen. Boyd and Kallesen 29 provide an analysis of the differences between
priceable and yieldable demand, also respectively called price-oriented and product-
oriented demand. Yieldable demand refers to customers who buy a ticket with
respect to the product it represents (with restrictions and advance purchase
requirements) and corresponds to the traditional assumptions of Revenue
Management. Priceable demand corresponds to customers who buy the lowest
available fare, irrespective of restrictions and advance purchase requirements, and it
generally refers to markets in which a low-cost carrier entered. In most cases, both
types of demand coexist in the same leg, but they cannot be addressed the same
way, providing new challenges in modeling, forecasting and optimization for Revenue
Management Systems.
2.3. Traditional Revenue Management in Less Restricted
Environments: the "Spiral Down" Effect
The legacy carriers have responded to the entrance of LCCs in some of their legs
with major changes in their sets of fare products (in the specified legs). They tend to
partially or fully match the LCC in terms of fares products:
/ Lower fares
/ Removal of certain restrictions (Saturday night stay, non-refundability and/or
change fees)
/ Reduced advance purchase requirements
These changes might be quite complex; they might be applied to all fare classes in a
market, or only to a reduced number of classes and they might be applied to
connecting and local fares or only to local fares.
28 DUNLEAVY and WESTERMAN, Future of Airline Revenue Management, Journal of Revenue and Pricing
Management, Vol 3, No 4, Jan 2005
29 BOYD and KALLESEN, The Science of Revenue Management when Passengers Purchase the Lowest
Available Fare, Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, Vol 3, No 2, Jul 2004
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In these new kinds of hybrid networks, the fundamental assumptions of traditional
RMS are in jeopardy:
/ The independence of demand by fare class is no longer valid. Customers are
offered undifferentiated products, so they buy the lowest available fare. Thus
demand for highest classes do not materialize, and it becomes impossible to
establish forecasts for highest fare classes based on historical data.
/ The customer segmentation rules are violated as well. The differences
between "leisure" and "business" passengers are eroding, business
passengers becoming more sensitive to price for instance.
In these conditions, it happens that the traditional RMSs perform quite poorly, as far
as they are by definition based on the fare product structure (restrictions + advance
purchase requirements). The combination of the violation of the assumptions and the
poor performance of traditional RMSs leads to the "buy-down" and "spiral-down"
effects - presented below - which translate into severe revenue losses.
Both phenomena have been described based on analysis done with the Passenger
Origin-Destination Simulator PODS by Cusano30 , but also by Ozdaryal and
Saranathan".
The buy-down Phenomenon consists of a series of simultaneous processes which,
combined, lead to a decrease in the average fare paid per passenger:
/ The removal (total or partial) of the restrictions and advance purchase
requirements leads to the violation of the customer segmentation principles
/ The assumption of demand independence between fare classes is invalidated
/ The excess in capacity caused even more losses when lower class demand
started to materialize close to departure date (violation of the customers'
behaviors assumptions)
The Spiral-down Phenomenon is the direct consequence of the buy-down
phenomenon. As said, the removal of fare product differentiation led to a decrease in
yield. Legacy airlines tried without success to replace these fare rules by new
inventory strategies, and were stuck into a cycle leading to lower and lower revenues
as shown on Figure 131.
30 CUSANO, Airline Revenue Management Under Alternative Fare Structures, Master's Thesis, MIT,
Cambridge, MA, 2003
31 OZDARYAL and SARANATHAN, Revenue Management in Broken Fare Fence Environment, Presentation
to AGIFORS, Auckland, New Zealand, Jan 2004
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Figure 1: Spiral-Down Effect
When a traditional RMS deals with an unrestricted environment, the excess of
capacity (caused for instance by the Sept. 11, 2001 events) leads high-fare
passengers to buy-down. This consequently encourages lower forecasts for high-fare
demand (given that high-fare demand did not materialize), reducing the protection
for high-fare passengers. Finally, this change in booking limits leads to an increase in
the number of seats available for lower classes. The cycle then spirals down.
The customer, who is given the choice between buying a ticket to the legacy carrier
or to the low-cost carrier, will for sure choose the LCC if the legacy carrier does not
match with its competitor. So the legacy carrier has to match, and then, as described
earlier, the spiral down effect feeds itself when the airline removes the fences
between fare classes. This results in lower revenues for the "attacked" airline.
Cooper and Homen-de-Mello 3 have modeled mathematically the spiral down effect
occurring when using traditional forecasting methods. The purpose of their paper is
to study the (more general) effect of a violation of the fundamental assumptions
taken for granted in the traditional revenue management algorithms. They define,
for the model they have built, precisely under what conditions and how the spiral
down effect occurs.
Since 2001, the revenue management world has focused on the spiral-down problem
to try to come up with alternatives, but at this point, no one has found the optimal
solution in helping the legacy carriers with recovering significantly from revenue loss
due to competition with LCC in a set of markets. This thesis will present two
complementary alternatives to traditional revenue management methods designed to
address the problems raised above.
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3. APPROACH
3.1. PODS Overview
This thesis makes use of PODS, the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator 25,
developed at Boeing by Hopperstad. It simulates realistically the environment of
competing airline companies. PODS evolved from the Decision Window Model32 by
incorporating major simulation capabilities in addition to schedules, airline image and
aircraft types, such as the Revenue Management systems, the fares offered on each
flight and path, the restrictions associated with each fare, and the possibility for the
passenger to choose between several competing airlines.
PODS simulates for a single day's departures the booking process on a network of
flights for one or more airlines which can use different Revenue Management
methods. The simulator produces various output files which allow the researcher to
analyze the impact of the different revenue management and forecasting methods
and/or different fare structures in various environments.
Since PODS has been described several times by Zickus, Gorin and Carrier", the
description of the simulator in this thesis will be an overview and the reader should
refer to these materials for more detailed descriptions.
3.1.1. The Simulator
PODS will be used to simulate several airlines operating a network of flights in a
competitive environment in order to measure the performance of different revenue
management methods. The simulator is composed of 4 major elements linked as
shown on Figure 2.
32 Decision Window Path Preference Model (DWM), The Boeing Company, Feb 1994
33 ZICKUS, Forecasting for Airline Network revenue Management; Revenue and Competitive Impacts, May
1998
GORIN, Airline Revenue Management: sell-up and Forecasting Algorithms, June 2000
CARRIER, Modeling Airline Passenger Choice: Passenger Preference for Schedule in the Passenger Origin-
Destination Simulator (PODS), May 2003
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Figure 2: PODS Flow Chart
Source: Hopperstad 2 S
The simulation flow begins at the bottom of Figure 2. The booking data from
previous flights is collected into the historical database, which, with the current
booking status (from the Revenue Management optimizer), is used by the forecaster
to estimate the future demand for a given flight. These expected bookings are then
fed into the Revenue Management optimizer, which computes the seat protections
and availability based on current path and class bookings as well as cancellations.
Finally, the availability data is fed into the passenger choice model, which generates
future passengers' characteristics and assigns them to available path-fare
combinations according to their decision window, budget and preferences. Then all
the information is input back into the model again to provide historical data to the
Revenue Management optimizer for the next optimizations and future flight
departures
In the next paragraphs, only the relevant parameters, with respect to the subject of
this thesis, will be described. For a more complete description of the PODS Model, its
inputs, fares, restrictions, outputs, various networks, the reader should refer to the
works of Zickus, Gorin and Carrier33 which contain complementary and extensive
explanations of the different aspects of the simulator. The following is just a brief
summary.
PODS is a simulator of the behavior of the passengers, the way they choose between
paths, airline companies, and fare products given what the airline companies decided
to make available in terms of these fare products. There are therefore two
distinguishable components in PODS as shown in Figure 3.
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How Passengers choose How Airlines set their
flights and fares availabilities of paths and
Based on the Passenger fare classes
Choice Model Based on historical data
and forecasts
Figure 3: The Two Main Components of PODS
One particular run of PODS is comprised of 5 independent trials, each of them being
the repetition (600 times generally) of a single departure day (for instance Mondays)
called a sample, over and over without cycles or seasonality. The first 200 samples
of each trial are burnt to avoid transient effects. In a given trial, the samples are not
independent, since they are used for historical purposes. Finally, the results provided
are averaged over the 5 trials.
3.1.2. The Network Parameters
At the network level, the inputs include:
/ The number of Airlines
/ The number of Origin-Destination Markets
/ The number of flights per day
/ The departure time and capacity of each flight
/ The number of fare classes and associated fares, advance purchase
requirements and restrictions (like non-refundability, change fee, Saturday
night stay)
3.1.3. The Passengers
At the passenger level, the inputs include:
/ The demand by day, OD and Passenger Type (Business, Leisure) are given in
terms of means and standard deviations that vary day after day
/ The arrival curves by passenger types, which typically look like those of
Figure 4. It translates the fact that leisure passengers book early while the
majority of business passengers book during the last days before departure
date.
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Figure 4: Arrival Curves by Passenger Type
The Passenger Choice Model.
This model is based on and has evolved from the Boeing Decision Window Model32
(DWM), itself using as input the maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) curves given by
passenger types as shown in Figure 5.
WTP
Q M
(Base Fare)
---- Business
Leisure: ................. Leisu re$
B Y Fare $
For instance, in this 4-fare-classes
environment, we notice that only 50%
of the leisure passengers are willing to
pay for the M fare whereas still 100%
of the business passengers are willing
to pay for it.
Figure 5: Willingness-To-Pay Curves by Passenger Type
To account for the cost they represent for a given passenger type, the OD fares are
also adjusted with the disutility costs associated with the different restrictions Ri:
Total Generalized Cost = OD Fare + IRi(Evaluated Cost of Ri)
These features are used and organized in the process shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Passenger Choice Model - Process Overview
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3.1.4. Forecastinci and Detruncation
As mentioned during the introduction and the literature review, the main assumption
on which the traditional revenue management methods are based is the
independence of demand by fare class. The forecasts by fare-class are re-computed
at every Time-Frame (TF) during the booking process, that is at arbitrarily fixed
shrinking intervals until the day-of-departure.
Forecasting (by time-frame/itinerary/fare class)
The forecasts in PODS are computed at each time frame, and are based on historical
data (26 previous samples or "Mondays"). The goal is to estimate the unconstrained
demand, and the first step for doing this is to test if we need to detruncate the
historical data or not, as explained in Figure 7.
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[
Historical Sample:
by itinerary k, TFi, fare class j
II II
I
Has the fare class j been closed
before departure?
H
Bookings = Unconstrained
Demand
V
) I Bookings * UnconstrainedDemand
Need Detruncation
(described below)
( Unconstrained Demand
Data fed into the FORECASTER
for itinerary k, TFI, fare class j
Figure 7: Detruncation/Forecasting Process
Once the unconstrained demand is estimated from the previous samples, several
forecasting methods can be used:
/ Pick-Up Moving Average (PUMA), based on the "Bookings-To-Come" from TFi:
average over the previous samples of occurrences of additional bookings
between TFi and the departure date
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/ PUMA with exponential smoothing: allows putting more weight on the more
recent samples with respect to older ones
/ Booking Regression: estimates from the previous samples the parameters a
and b so that the number of booked seats (BKD) is given by the equation
BKD(TFo) = a + b*BKD(TFi)
Detruncation
Detruncation is needed when fare classes closed down before departure
order to estimate the unconstrained demand and feed the forecaster.
detruncating, the forecast would not be accurate and revenues would
optimized.
date, in
Without
not be
Two different methods can be used to detruncate. The first method is called Booking
Curve Detruncation (Probability-based) and is presented in Figure 8.
BKD(TF,)/BKD(TFo)
for class i
Unconstrained
Demand
100%
0%
16 4 0
- Extrapolated curve
-Actual Booking curve
(at TF4, the class was closed)
Time Frames
Figure 8: Booking Curve Detruncation Process
The second method is Projection Detruncation (Spill-based). Given the fact that the
class was closed down before the departure date, we only observe a part of the
unconstrained demand (see Figure 9). The method is based on estimating the ratio
of opened class over the unconstrained demand, and iterating until convergence. It
is also governed in PODS by a parameter tau (T).
Obse
Cap
Unknown
(closed)
Spax
Figure 9: Projection Detruncation Process
For more details, refer to Gorin33, in which is described precisely the mechanisms
involved as well as the range and influence of the tau parameter.
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3.1.5. Revenue Management - Seat Inventory Control
The goal of the revenue management optimization is to compute the booking limits
for the different classes of each flight given the demand forecasts for each itinerary.
The family of Revenue Management methods is very broad, but we can regroup the
methods into sub-families which share some common features, from the least to the
most sophisticated method.
Base Line
Used as reference to measure the performance and compare revenue management
methods, the First Come First Served (FCFS) booking method is the most basic
way to fill the aircraft. There is no booking limit in this method; the passengers buy
seats as soon as they arrive, and as long as the requested class is not filled or closed
due to advance purchase requirements.
Threshold Algorithms
The Threshold algorithms are the first step in managing booking limits. A threshold
(between 0% and 100%) is associated with each fare class and as soon as the ratio
of "total bookings over capacity" reaches one of the thresholds, the corresponding
class is closed down. In PODS, two different threshold methods are implemented:
Fixed Threshold (FT) for which the threshold values are specified (typically 1.00,
0.85, 0.60, 0.40 for the 4-fare-class case) in the input file and remain the same for
the entire booking period, and Adaptive (or Accordion) Threshold (AT), for which a
load factor target is set in the input file - generally at 80% - and the threshold
values are computed and optimized at each time frame according to the actual
bookings recorded until this point.
Fare Class Yield Management (FCYM)
It is a leg-based RM Method, generally used with Pick-Up Forecasting and
Probabilistic Detruncation. The optimizer deals with a nested inventory, based on the
Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSRb"), the revenue we can expect from the
next seat available for a given class (= OD Fare * probability to sell it).
Again, the optimization is based on the assumption that the demand for each fare
class is described by an independent distribution. Given the standard fare structure
and demand for a 100-seat flight represented in Table 1, the EMSRb Booking Limit
Optimization is shown for this example on Figure 10.
Class Fare Avge stdev BL
Y $400 20 5 100
B $250 30 8 82
M $160 40 10 46
Q $100 40 10 18
Table 1: Example of Fare Class Structure in the Process of Optimizing the Seat
Inventory
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EMSR EMSR curve for the Y class protection
At this point, the expected revenue of
are selling a B fare is higher than the expected
revenue of selling a Y fare
BL(B)
- -- EMSR curve for the B class
MK".,
BL(Q)BL(M) CAP Seats
Figure 10: EMSR Curve and Booking Limits
The booking limit for fare class i represents the total number of bookings at which
the fare class is closed down, to protect seats for higher fare classes (<i). For
instance, in the case described above, if BL(M) bookings have been recorded, only B
and Y fares will be available for the next requests. Nested limits are shown on Figure
11.
Seats
BL 1
BL 2
BL 3
BL4
Total number of available seats
Protected for Classes Y+B from M & Q
Protected for Classes Y+B+M from Q
Y B M Q
Figure 11: The Nested Booking Limits
Greedy Virtual Nesting (GVN)
GVN is the first step in the process of accounting for connecting passengers, even if
it is still a leg-based optimization. If we deal with a single leg without any
connections, the result in terms of Booking Limits will be the same as the one
obtained in the previous case. Let's consider now the case when we have two legs
presented on Figure 12.
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Figure 12: Simple 2-legs OD Market
GVN will create, as its name indicates, n virtual classes for each LEG, in which it will
order both local and connecting fares. Then, it applies the EMSR optimization for
each LEG to the virtual classes as shown on Figure 13.
1 Y conn EMSR
2 Y local
3 Bconn
gr4 M Conn O i N
5 B local
6 M local
7 Q conn
8 Q IocalI.......... 4 .. . .... .... . .. ..............S 
e t
Booking Limits
Figure 13: EMSR Optimization in the GVN Case
Consequently, a connecting booking will be accepted if ALL the virtual classes in
which the fare is bucketed in each of its legs are still open at the time of the request.
Given the relative high fare of the connecting itinerary with respect to locals
individually, preference will be given to connecting passengers in most of cases. The
problem is that it may cause the denial of two local passengers on both legs if the
itinerary involves two legs, and often, it happens that the sum of the two local fares
is greater than the connecting fare for a same fare class.
Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting (DAVN)
The goal of DAVN is to answer the problem raised at the end of the previous
paragraph. This time, the method requires a path/class forecasting and detruncation.
The principle is to apply a penalty to the connecting fares that accounts for the
potential displacement of a local passenger. On the leg i that belongs to the
connecting itinerary, the passenger's total fare will be replaced in the bucketing by
the fare minus the sum of the displacement costs associated with all other legs
involved in the itinerary.
Bucketed Faregi = ODFare 
- Zd,
jEffinerary
J i
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Where dj represents the displacement cost associated with leg j.
The displacement costs are computed as the dual solution of a deterministic linear
program solved over the network, in which we look for maximizing total revenue
subject to capacity and forecast constraints. This LP problem was described by
34Williamson
Thus, for each given
network value of each
than GVN does. The
regularly re-optimized
leg, the ranking in the bucketing process is based on the
booking, and gives less preference to connecting passengers
displacement costs as well as the size of the buckets are
during the booking process.
Example: if we use the small network described above in the GVN sub-section (2
legs, 3 markets), given the OD forecasts (considered being deterministic), the LP is
formulated as follows:
MAX (px| + p'x + ppx' + p 2 MAX px|
OD Class
i j /
Subject to
D ( 
OD i class j
x|8,k { C,
V OD i, class j
V leg k
Where:
i represents an OD market
j represents a fare class
k represents a leg
p| represents the fare of fare class j in the OD i
x| represents the number of passengers flying in fare class j in the OD i
fP represents the mean of the forecast for fare class j in the OD i
= 1 if leg k is traversed by the passenger's itinerary in the OD i
= 0 otherwise
Ck represents the aircraft capacity on leg k
The solution of this LP provides optimal values for the set (x|l), and more
interestingly the dual solution (d, ),represents, for each leg k, the marginal revenue
obtained by adding an extra seat to the capacity on leg
the displacement costs in the bucketing process of
described above.
k. These values are used as
the connecting passengers
3 WILLIAMSON, Airline Network Seat Inventory Control: Methodologies and Revenue Impacts, June 1992
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Heuristic Bid-Price (HBP)
HBP is based on the GVN structure, and tries to approach the ideas developed in
DAVN while still using a leg-base forecast instead of the path/class forecast needed
for DAVN. It is both an improved GVN and an approximation of DAVN. The HBP
presented below was developed by Belobabaa5 .
Let's consider the network previously described (2 legs, 3 markets). For each leg,
HBP compute the EMSR-optimized Booking Limits as shown on Figure 14.
LEG 1 LEG 2EMSR' EMSR'
E2 ----------------
CAP1 CAP2
Figure 14: EMSR Curves in the case of HBP
E1 and E2 are, for each leg, the minimum value at which we accept a booking
(whatever the fare class). In no case we want to accept a booking for a value less
than E1 in leg 1 and less than E2 in leg 2. (It should be noticed that the higher the
demand, the higher Ei)
Therefore, we can infer that some combination of these two numbers El and E2 is a
good indication for a minimum price at which we would accept one connecting
booking. In HBP, this minimum price is called the Bid Price (BP), and is defined by:
BPOD3 = max(E1 ,E2) + d*min(E1 ,E2)
Where d is the bid-price coefficient and can roughly be interpreted as the probability
to displace two connecting local passengers (e.g. for instance 0.5*0.5=0.25 if we
assume roughly that the mix is 50% local, 50% connecting).
Probabilistic Bid-Price (ProBP)
This is the - theoretically - most advanced RM Method at this point, using a forecast
based on path and fare class. It is a probabilistic network optimization algorithm (the
drawback of DAVN was to be based on deterministic assumptions). On the other
hand, it is the reason why it is quite complex and more difficult to implement. For a
complete and detailed description of ProBP, refer to Bratu36 .
ProBP is an iterative algorithm. The first step proposes to draw a complete EMSR
graph for both legs of the connecting itinerary, taking into account all possible other
3s BELOBABA, The Evolution of Airline Yield Management: Fare Class to Origin-Destination Seat
Inventory Control, Handbook of Airline Marketing, 1st Ed., 1998, Chapter 23, pp. 285-302
36 BRATU, Network Value Concept in Airline Revenue Management, June 1998
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connections. From the graphs, we compute the values E1 (=E 11 ) and E2 (=E' 2)
defined in the HBP paragraph. This is the end of the first iteration.
Next, the highest OD fares (let Yli and Y' 2 be these highest fares) are pro-rated:
Y2 = Y x X and 1 =Y x 21 1 Y2 = Y2 XEl +E 2  El +E2
And then the EMSR optimization is applied once again, providing E2 1 , E22 ...
It happens that the sequences of Eli and E'2 converge very quickly and it has been
derived (See Bratu 9 ) that is converges toward the optimal solution, (E'1 and E'2).
The Bid-Price is then defined by BP = Efi + E'2 . Again, a connecting booking will be
accepted if its fare is greater than BP.
Some other RM methods exist which combine some features of several of the
methods described above.
3.2. The Specifics of PODS Related to this Thesis
3.2.1. Environments
Single Market
The single market case (Figure 15) in PODS consists of 2 airline companies,
competing in one Origin-Destination Market, with 3 flights per day in only one
direction (same direction for both). Both of them offer 8 fare classes with associated
products.
Origin Destination
Figure 15: Single Market
Network D with New Entrant
The Network D is more complicated than the single market, since it involves 482 OD
Markets and 3 airline companies. It is based on the networks of 2 legacy carriers
which operate a hub (Hub 1 in MSP, Hub 2 in DFW). Each airline operates 41 legs,
between 20 spokes on the West coast and its hub, 20 other legs between its hub and
20 spokes on the East coast, and finally 1 leg between both hubs. The legs are
organized in banks, and there are 3 of them during the day, corresponding to 3 flows
from the West coast to the East coast.
The "New Entrant" (e.g. LCC) is operating non-stop flights only between Hub 1 and
the 10 largest markets on the East coast (with three flows per day as well). It is
therefore in direct competition with the legacy carrier operating Hub 1 in 10 OD
Markets. Obviously, the airline operating Hub 2 (called AL2) will almost not be
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affected by this competition given that it only operates connecting flights in the 10
"New Entrant Markets" (NEM) and was already not competitive against AL1 in these
markets. The schedule of the new entrant's flights are the same as the legacy
carrier's in order to avoid any schedule effects which are not the object of this
analysis.
PODS allows to use, for both legacy carriers, a different fare product structure in
these 10 markets.
The 482 Origin-destination Markets are mixed between
/ Non-stop flights from 20 western spoke cities to hubs H1 and H2
/ Non-stop flights from hubs H1 and H2 to 20 eastern spoke cities
/ 82 non-stop "local" markets to/from/between hubs operated by the legacy
carriers
/ 10 non-stop "local" markets between hub H1 and10 eastern operated by the
LCC
/ 400 connecting O-D markets
Figure 16, Figure 17 and Figure 18 represent the Airlines' networks.
'39
Figure 16: AL1's Network
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Figure 18: AL3 (New Entrant)'s Network
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The impacts of the New Entrant on AL1's network are shown on Table 2.
IMPACT Total Affected Percent
Total Legs 126 30 24%Markets 482 10 2%
Local Markets 42 10 24%
Network Level Passengers 7,200 878 12%RPMs 9,524,153 595,306 6%
Leg-level Passengers 10,629 2,740 26%
RPMs 10,371,190 1,856,086 18%
Table 2: Impact of the New Entrant on ALl's network (Source: Gorin4 4 )
3.2.2. Fare Products
The fare products in PODS are comprised of fares by fare class, associated with
restrictions and advance purchase requirements. The restrictions are defined by their
disutility costs. RI is the strongest one (Saturday night stay requirement for
instance), R2 and R3 have a lower cost (change fee or non-refundability for
instance). The Advance Purchase requirements (AP) are defined by days before the
date-of-departure, and generally they are referred in terms of Time-Frames (TF).
The re-optimization time in PODS are indeed organized in 16 Time-Frames,
corresponding to days to departure date as shown in Table 3.
Time Frame 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Days to departure 63 56 49 42 35 31 28 24 21 17 14 10 7 5 3 1 0
Table 3 Time-Frames Definitions
Fully Restricted Fare Products:
The Table 4 presents an example of fare product, with 4 fare classes (Network D
case) in a fully restricted environment.
Advance PurchaseClass Fare TF Days
Y $ 400
B $ 200
M $ 150
Q $ 100
16
12
10
8
0
7
14
21
Restrictions
R1  R2  R3
0 0 0
1 0 0
1 1 0
1 1 1
Table 4: Traditional 4 Fare Classes Structure
The Advance Purchase (AP) requirements are given here in terms of days to
departure date or in terms of number of Time Frames during which the fare product
is available, starting from the beginning of the booking period (TF1).
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Fully U nrestricted/ Undifferentiated Fare Products:
Table 5 and Table 6 are two examples of fare products, with either 8 (single market
case - Table 5) or 4 fare classes (Network D case, in the so-called 10 NEM - Table 6)
in a fully unrestricted environment, without Advance Purchase requirements or
Restrictions.
Advance PurchaseClass Fare TF Days
Y $
B $
M $
Q $
200
160
125
90
16
16
16
16
0
0
0
0
Restrictions
R1 R2 R3
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
Table 5: Unrestricted 4 Fare Classes Structure
With respect to the restricted environment, the fare ratios have been compressed
(and the base fare is reduced by $10), restrictions have disappeared and all fare
products are available during the entire booking period (e.g. no more advance
purchase requirement) unless closed by the Revenue Management system.
Advance PurchaseClass Fare TF Days
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
$$
$
$
$
$
$
$
625
515
405
295
240
185
155
125
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Restrictions
R 1 R 2 R3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Table 6: Unrestricted 8 Fare Classes Structure
In the single market case "unrestricted", we usually use the 8-fare-class structure,
with, like in the case of the 4-fare classes, the availability of all undifferentiated 8
fare products during the entire booking period.
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3.3. Sell-up: Introducing Alternatives to Address the
Unrestricted Environments' "Spiral Down" Problem
3.3.1. Traditional Sell-up Utilization
Sell-up happens when a passenger is denied booking on a particular flight and
decides to pay more for the same flight and accepts the next higher fare available. In
the end, if the passenger travels with the same airline, he (or she) can be either
recaptured on the same flight in a higher fare class, or on another flight in the same
fare class. In both cases, this represents an increase in revenue that we want to
account for in the seat inventory control process.
The sell-up model, presented by Belobaba-Weatherford 37 and its benefits are
extensively detailed by Gorin 33 and Bohutinsky38 , but as the methods presented
further are significantly based on this important notion, this is a short summary
about sell-up, willingness-to-pay and the way they can be applied into PODS.
The Maximum Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) represents the maximum price a passenger
is willing to pay for a flight, and is used by the Revenue Management system in the
estimation of the probability that a passenger will agree to sell-up. From this point of
view, one of the main means used in Revenue Management is to get each passenger
to pay his (or her) maximum price. Legacy airlines have tried to differentiate
customers according to their maximum WTP, generally into 2 passenger types:
business (time sensitive, not price sensitive, time constraint) and leisure (price
sensitive, less time constraint and look for interesting deals). Consequently, the
disutility costs associated with each restriction is different according to the passenger
type. The differentiation done between business and leisure passengers is another
important assumption which fades nowadays.
Therefore, accounting for sell-up as been considered as a means to increase profit
and airlines have tried to integrate it into the revenue management algorithms.
Bohutinsky's Master's Thesis has shown that:
/ sell-up depends on demand relative to capacity (the higher the demand, the
higher the sell-up probability)
/ sell-up rate is higher in higher classes
/ in a competitive market, the competitor can recapture the denied passenger,
especially as travel websites are developed which allow easy comparison
between the products offered by each airline
Belobaba and Weatherford developed a sell-up modification to be used in the EMSRb
algorithm, based on a decision tree which allows for adjusting the Booking Limits in
order to account for sell-up probabilities.
3 BELOBABA-WEATHERFORD, Comparing Decision Rules that Incorporate Customer Diversion in
Perishable Asset Revenue Management Situations, Decision Science 27, 343, 1996
38 BOHUTINSKY, The Sell-up Potential of Airline Demand, Masters Thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1990
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In the 2-fare-class case, the idea is as follows. The new booking limit (which
intuitively increases protection for higher fare classes) simply accounts for the
probability of sell-up:
EMSRb(S' + V2)x (1- p)+ p x f, =f 2 13
Where:
S' represents the protection for class 1 from class 2
V2 represents the additional protection obtained through the heuristic
p represents the probability of sell-up from class 2 to 1
f, represents the fare of class i
It is illustrated on the following Figure 19, where f2 appears to be the weighted mean
of f1 (affected of weight p) and EMSRb(S2 +V2 1 ) (affected of weight 1-p):
EMSRb Extra protection
f) ......... ).
f2  =EM SRb(S 21) -- .--.-.-.- - - -----
EM SRb(S 2 .+V.) --- --.........---... .
S2
S2 +V21
Figure 19: Additional Protection from Sell-up Accounting in the EMSR Optimization
The method had both benefits and drawbacks. Form Gorin and Bohutinsky, it
appears that this simple algorithm allows for an increase in revenue by 2% with
respect to traditional EMSRb algorithm. It depends strongly on the fare ratio between
consecutive fare classes; sell-up rate and demand distribution of the higher fare
class, but there were at this point no estimation of the sell-up rate, which is critical
to the algorithm. As we will see, the algorithms we will refer to in this thesis are
based on sell-up and elasticity and the estimation part is one of the critical and
difficult ones.
3.3.2. New Methods to Address Undifferentiated Environments
To respond to the introduction of fare products with almost no restriction nor
advance purchase requirements, legacy carriers typically match their competitors.
But in this different environment, the fundamental assumption (independence of
demand by fare class) on which the traditional revenue management methods are
based is largely violated. At this point, airlines must develop new methods adapted
to this new environment, among which:
/ Basic Load Factor based control: Threshold Revenue Management methods
/ Modified version of leg-based dynamic programming
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/ Q-Forecasting
/ Fare Adjustment methods
This thesis will focus on the last two alternatives, Q-Forecasting and Fare Adjustment
methods. Dynamic Programming will not be used in this thesis. The threshold
revenue management methods - which are used by the "new entrant" in PODS - are
simple enough to be considered as self-explaining (see sub-section 3.1.5 for a more
detailed description).
3.4. Q-Forecasting
3.4.1. Overview of Processes and Concepts
Legacy carriers respond to the entrance of a low-cost carrier in a given set of
markets with significant change in their fare structure in these markets to match the
new entrant fare products, which tend to be less differentiated. Q forecasting is
designed to answer to the fact that we cannot rely anymore on the "independence
between fare classes demand" assumption, which is especially true in an
undifferentiated environment. The lower differentiation there is between fare
products, the more interdependence between fare classes. This leads to the concept
of "spiral down": as samples go, demand is underestimated and revenues drop:
under undifferentiated fare structure, customers buy the lowest fare available
associated revenues decrease
this "buy-down" phenomenon is recorded as lower fare demand and thus the
forecaster predicts less higher class demand
the optimizer decreases protection for higher fare classes (since that demand
has shifted to lower classes)
this allows even more buy-down, and the spiral-down continues
Current Revenue Management methods are not adapted to the undifferentiated
environment since that they are based on the segmentation of demand achieved via
advance purchase requirements and restrictions and since that they assume
independence of demand by fare classes.
Belobaba and Hopperstad39 have developed modified forecasting and optimization
approaches that do not rely on independent class demand. The basic idea is
therefore to forecast only total demand at lowest class and to account for the
passengers' willingness to pay higher fares. The forecaster will predict an expected
number of "Q-equivalent passengers", meaning the demand for the lowest class (in
case only this class is available). The aim is still to use a fare class structure to set
the booking limits, but demand and bookings are transformed to Q-equivalent
bookings and re-partitioned from total equivalent demand at lowest fare to demand
39 BELOBABA and HOPPERSTAD, Algorithms for Revenue Management in Unrestricted Fare Markets,
AGIFORS, Auckland, New Zealand, Jan 2004
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by fare class. The transition between fare class demand and Q-equivalent demand is
based on the Willingness-To-Pay, and will be described later. Figure 20 presents an
overview of the process.
[Consider the cases in the historical database whenQ was closed (condition for sell-up occurrence) I
Transform historical class bookings to a "Q-
equivalent" number of bookings
I
I
Sum up the Q-equivalent bookings computed for
each fare class (Q-eq. for Q class is Q)
Apply detruncation to total Q-equivalent bookings
when needed
I
I
Apply the forecasting to the Q-equivalent bookings
numbers obtained for each sample used
Re-Partition the Q-equivalent forecast into the
different classes to generate the demand by class
Compute the booking limits using traditional
optimizer
Figure 20: Q-Forecasting Process Overview
I
1
3.4.2. The Sell-up Formulation
PODS makes use of an exponential distribution for the probability of sell-up. The
probability psupQf that "a random passenger would sell-up to class f, given he
would have chosen the lower class (called here class Q) and that no other class is
available" 0 is:
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p farej supcono
p SUP Q_+ =e fareQ
Where:
supcontf is the sell-up constant for time frame if
fare; represents the fare of class i
The airline in PODS has to specify as input a value for supcontf in terms of the fare
ratio Frat5tf (relative to lowest fare Q) at which 50% of the passengers are expected
to sell-up for each Time-Frame. The values supcontf and Frat5t are linked by the
following formula.
-In(
Frat50 
-1
Typical values for Frat5 exhibit an S-shape reflecting the change in the mix
business/leisure across time frames as shown on Figure 21.
4.0
3.5
3.0
2 2.5U-
2 .0 -- - --
1.5
1 .0 -i i i i i i i
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Time-Frame
Figure 21: Typical Frat5 Curve
The Frat5 are indeed expected to increase during the booking process for a given
flight. Early in the booking process, 50% of the customers (leisure passengers in
majority) would only be willing to sell-up from a Q fare of $100 to an M fare of $140.
This implies a Frat5 value of 1.4. On the contrary, at the end of the booking process,
it might be that 50% of the customers (business passengers in majority) would be
willing to sell-up from a Q fare of $100 to a Y fare of $350. This implies a Frat5 value
of 3.5.
On Figure 22 are shown the graphs of psupQ.f as a function of the fare ratio for 3
different values of the sell-up constant supcontf, computed from the previous Frat5
graph respectively at Time-Frames 1, 5 and 7, using the above formula.
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Figure 22: Probability of Sell-up Curves as a function of the fare ratio
As we can notice, the negative exponential tends faster toward zero as the supconf,
is higher.
The sell-up probabilities by fare class (assuming the fares described in Table 5 and
the above Frat5) as a function of Time-Frame are presented in Figure 23.
100% 1
80%
60%-
40% -
20%
0%
-- Q to M
-Qto B
Q to Y
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Time-Frame
Figure 23: Probability of Sell-up as a Function of Time-Frame
The classes are ranked from the highest to the lowest class as follow: Y, B, M and Q.
As expected, at any given TF, the probability of sell-up from the lowest class (Q) to
class i decreases when i decreases (e.g. up to the 1 st class = Y class).
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Modification to the forecaster:
As suggested above, the standard forecasting and detruncation are used, but only
applied to the total Q-equivalent demand. For each time-frame, all historical
bookings hbkf for all classes f are converted to Q-equivalent bookings given
estimated sell-up rates psupQ.>f as inputs according to the straight forward formula:
hbk~
hbkQ =Z
f P SUP Q).
The Table 7 is an example of transformation of historical bookings records to Q-
equivalent bookings:
Class Bookings Sell-up hbkf
f hbk, PSUPQf PSUPQ-*f
Y 5 15% 33
B 10 40% 25
M 20 70% 28
Q 30 100% 30
hbkQ 116
Table 7: Scale-Down Computation for a 4-fare classes structure
Then the standard forecasting (exponential smoothing, linear regression, pick-up...)
and detruncation (booking curve, projection...) are applied to the hbkq, providing the
mean (fcpQ ) and the standard deviation (fco-Q) of the forecasted Q-equivalent
demand.
Notice (the terminology will be used again later in the thesis) that for detruncation in
PODS, a path is marked as closed only if the highest class (generally Y) is closed.
Finally comes the optimization process. In order to be able to use the same optimizer
as in a traditional process, we need to convert the forecasted Q-equivalent into an n-
fare-classes structure. This is done by reversing the previous process. Under the
assumption that passengers arrive in reverse order relative to their WTP, the
approach is to re-partition the Q-equivalent demand into class demand based on the
probability that a random passenger will sell-up to f but not to f-1. In PODS, the
corresponding revised mean and standard deviation of demand for class f are
computed from:
fcp',f = fcpQ -(p Sup ,5 -P SUPJ_)
fco-
fco-',= fcoaQ J~P v- PQvaJ11 = fc" -fefl'f
Sfcpl0
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The new mean for class f demand will be proportional to the Q-equivalent forecast
and to the probability of sell-up to this specific class. The standard deviation can be
written as a function of the repartitioned demand for the same class, and the Q-
equivalent demand forecast mean.
Then, for instance, the standard EMSRb optimizer provides the booking limits
corresponding to these values.
Table 8 shows the re-partitioning based on the values used in the previous example
(Table 7) for a specific departure, assuming the forecasted demand obtained across
time frames was 125.
Class Sell-up Proba
f PsupQs, 125*(p sup -psupQf)
Y 14% 125*(0.14-0.00) = 17.50
B 42% 125*(0.42-0.14) = 35.00
M 75% 125*(0.75-0.42) = 41.25
Q 1000/ 125*(1.00-0.75) = 31.25
tot 125
Table 8: Re-partitioning Computation for a 4 Fare Classes Structure
3.4.3. Sell-up Parameters in PODS
The implementing in PODS is an expanded version of the theory presented above. In
PODS, 2 sets of Frat5 are used for each airline:
/ Time-Frame Frat5 (TF-Frat5), which are used to transform historical booking
records (occurring during the Time Frame) to Q-equivalent bookings
/ Bookings-To-Come Frat5 (BTC-Frat5), which are used to re-convert Q-
equivalent forecasts to partitioned class forecasts (and therefore need to be
"Bookings-To-Come" values)
The difference is that the BTC-Frat5 value for TFi refers to the remaining booking
period, whereas the TF-Frat5 value for TFi is relative to the current Time-Frame. The
BTC-Frat5 for TFj can be derived (in the input sets used later in the simulations) from
the TF-Frat5 set, for instance as the average of the TF-Frat5 for TFi to TF16.
As well, the use of Q-forecasting can be turned on or off for each airline in a given
set of markets: when used, it is turned on in the markets with undifferentiated fare
product structure.
In order to conduct sensitivity analyses relative to the input Frat5, we have
arbitrarily come up with several sets of TF-Frat5 respecting the "S" shape, but with
decreasing aggressiveness (Set "A" is more aggressive than set "B", meaning that
the Booking Limits corresponding to the set "A" will protect more seats for the higher
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classes). Sets "A" to "E" are shown on Figure 24. The derived BTC-Frat5 sets are
presented on Figure 25.
Time-Frame FRATS Aggressiveness
-A
-B
-- C
-D
-E
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516
Time Frames
Figure 24: Time-Frame Frat5 as a Function of Time-Frames
Bookings-To-Come FRAT5
-A
-- B
C
- D
-E
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516
Time Frames
Figure 25: Bookings-To-Come Frat5 as a Function of Time-Frames
Several other input-Frat5 sets will be described and presented further in the thesis,
but these ones will be extensively used. The next step, described in the next sub-
section, will be to manage to correctly estimate the Frat5 values dynamically from
the historical booking records in order to make the Q-Forecasting process
independent from the input and more feasible for the airlines (the Frat5 values would
theoretically be different every day, and for every given itinerary).
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3.4.4. The Sell-up Estimator
As previously introduced, the sell-up estimator is designed to provide inputs
dynamically to the Q-Forecasting method. Q-Forecasting with input Frat5 as
described in the previous paragraph would require knowing and changing the frat5
values of each flight at each time-frame, which is unrealistic. The goal is therefore to
add to the method a feature which estimates dynamically, as part of the forecasting
process, based on historical booking records, the values of the Frat5.
The method described below has been introduced by Hopperstad4 1 . The process is
presented on Figure 26. Each step shown on this figure will be described in detail
below.
I
I
I
(
I
Convert historical observations to observed
psupo by Time-Frame & fare level
From psupo, compute the corresponding
supcon by Time-Frame & fare levels
Apply a regression to estimate supcon
across fare levels from psupo
Apply a regression to fit supcon across
Time-Frames
Check the accuracy of the regression and
apply boundaries if needed
I
J
I
)
)
Convert the obtained supcon to Frat5 by
Time-Frame
Combine Time-Frame Frat5 into Frat5 for
Bookings-To-Come
Figure 26: Sell-up Estimation Process
In the estimation process, a scale of fare ratios is defined. For each relevant path,
the fare ratio fr; are defined for class i in terms of the ratio of the class i fare to the Q
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fare (e.g. the lowest fare). The objective is then to estimate the probabilities of sell-
up psup for each level by time frame, apply a series of consecutive regressions and
to report them as Frat5 values.
The computation of the observed probability of sell-up, psupo, is part of the forecast
prediction method. The estimation process is applied only to cases when the Q class
was closed. For each Time-Frame, and each level corresponding to unclosed flights,
the estimator records:
/ The number Bookings which occurred during the Time-Frame tf for the lowest
class available (not Q, by assumption)
/ The Q-equivalent forecast for the considered Time-Frame. Notice that Time-
Frame forecasts (fbtf) are obtained from Bookings-To-Come forecasts (fbtc)
using estimated booking curves (pbook)
fbtc -(pbook,, - pbookg_)
1 - pbook_1
As a reminder, pbookt, represents the ratio of the number of bookings recorded until
Time-Frame tf over the total number of bookings at day-of-departure. (pbook,-
pbookef 1) represents the ratio of expected bookings during tf over the total number
of bookings, and the quotient (pbooker - pbooktf.1)/(1 - pbookes1) represents the
proportion of remaining bookings which occur during Time-Frame tf.
The observed probability of sell-up, psupo, is defined for each Time-Frame and each
fare level, as:
PSUP, su 0 bookingsfg
Qq forecastt1
Example:
Suppose we have 4 fare classes, Y, B, M and Q. For a given observation (Time-Frame
tf), Q is closed but not M. During Time-Frame tf, 10 bookings have been recorded.
The Q equivalent forecast of the same Time-Frame was 30. Therefore, the observed
probability of sell-up for tf was: psupotf=10/30=33%.
The idea of the forecast prediction method is that the sum of the Q-equivalent
forecasts is obtained owing to previous estimates of sell-up in previous samples. The
consecutive recalculations of psupo constitute a series of corrections and
convergence is achieved quickly.
At this point, we have a series of psupoftf. The next step is to estimate a
corresponding value of supcont, which do not depend on the fare levels. Knowing the
assumed relation between psupftf and supcontf:
p SUpJ fg(fri) = esupcony(frf
The Time-Frame supcon fit is done by weighted least squares fit (for a given Time-
Frame) using levels for which there were forecasts and bookings. The method
consists of picking supcontf and a scaling constant c such that:
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(PsupoJg -c-e -,, n"(f"f"' is minimized
f
Where: psupof = observed sell-up probability, class f
frf = fare ratio, class f
The obtained supconf, is now independent from the fare level. The following step
deals with checking the obtained supcontf values across Time-Frames by applying a
linear regression fit. We pick an intercept b and a slope a such that:
b+ a -tf-supcon, )2 is minimized
if
Then a correction is added to prevent negative values:
sup con',f = max[O.2, b + a -tf]
From this value of the supcon', the Time-Frame Frat5 values can be derived using
the following formula.
sup con, =
' Frat5,, -1
Finally, using again the estimated booking curves, we compute the Bookings-To-
Come values of the psup',tf as a weighted average across Time-Frames of the
remaining Time-Frame values of the psup'rt. The weights correspond to the
proportions of bookings expected during each Time-Frame.
nft
E p SUP' ftf BITC (pbookn - pbook_,)
,n= f
P SUP'JfBTC- 1- pbook,,-
From these probabilities of sell-up, the Bookings-To-Come Frat5 are then computed.
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3.5. Fare Adjustment Methods
The Fare Adjustment methods have been developed by Fiig and Isler4 2 in 2004 and
then implemented in PODS by Hopperstad. The main point of the methods is to
define an alternative capable to address the problem of the coexistence of different
fare structures in a single leg. Typically, one of them is a traditional, restricted fare
structure, whereas the other one is an unrestricted, low-cost-carrier-type fare
structure.
For instance, in PODS' Network D, the New Entrant airline (dedicated to be the low-
cost carrier) enters 10 non-stop markets. In these local markets, the legacy carrier
with which the New Entrant is competing has to match the fare structure for the local
passengers. On the contrary, the connecting passengers (for the network carrier)
flying on this particular leg are still in a traditional, restricted fare product
environment. Both structures co-exist on the same leg.
There are 2 distinct fare adjustment methods proposed for DAVN, so called MR (for
Marginal Revenue) and KI (for Karl Isler). The only difference is that MR is a
continuous method whereas KI is a discrete method. Apart from this, both are based
on the same concepts and will be presented simultaneously.
In this section, we will focus first on explaining the conflict resulting from the
presence of 2 different fare structures in the same leg for a given airline. Then the
overview will introduce the main mechanisms of the methods, which will be
described in the next section. Finally, the differences in terms of sell-up definition
between Fare Adjustment methods (FA) and Q-Forecasting methods (QF) will be
explained.
3.5.1. Overview of the Process
To understand the concept, it is important to understand the problem it addresses.
The co-existence of several distinct fare structures in the same leg. Let's consider
again the example of PODS' Network D with the New Entrant Airline (LCC) in a set of
10 local markets.
Under the restricted fare structure, demand for each fare class is assumed to be
independent and sell-up potential is not taken into account by the forecaster. Thus,
demand is segmented thanks to restrictions and advance purchase requirements. On
the contrary, under the unrestricted fare structure, revenues are maximized by
incorporating sell-up behavior into forecasting and optimization. In this case, higher-
class bookings depend entirely on closing down lower classes.
Therefore, in DAVN for instance, it may happen that in the same virtual bucket, 2 OD
Fares co-exist, each of them belonging to a different market and fare structure.
Then, the closure down of the bucket, which automatically make both fares
unavailable, may be optimal under the restricted fare structure and not at all under
42 FIIG and ISLER, SAS O&D Low-Cost Project, PODS, Minneapolis-St Paul, 2004
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the unrestricted fare structure (respectively, may the closure down
bucket may be optimal under the unrestricted fare structure and not at
restricted fare structure). Thus, revenues will not be maximized. On
described such a conflict.
Restricted
Fare
Structure
ODF-DisplCost
= Pi-Displ.
of the same
all under the
Figure 27 is
Unrestricted
Fare
Structure
ODF=P;
IL- -. Closed bucket
Buckets
Figure 27: Co-existence of distinct fare structures on the same leg
As a reminder, DAVN uses virtual buckets in which it orders the network revenue
contributions, which are equal to the OD-Fare minus the displacement cost (cf
Section 3.1.5). In the case considered here, the unrestricted fare structure applies to
local passengers, that is why there is no displacement cost subtracted from the OD
Fare Pj on the right hand side. If now the third bucket (starting from the bottom) is
closed down, both Pj and Pi are made unavailable, which might, as suggested above,
not be the optimal strategy for both structures.
The principle of the fare adjustment methods proposed by the Fare Adjustment
methods is, instead of optimizing the quantities "ODFare - Displacement Cost", to
optimize the quantities "Marginal Revenue - Displacement Cost". Given the specific
demand curve used in PODS (negative exponential), it also means (by hazard) to
subtract to the quantity "ODF - Displacement Cost" another amount, so-called Price-
Elasticity Cost (PEcost) which, in a sense, accounts for the risk of buy-down.
The effect of this method is to decrease the displacement-adjusted fares of the
unrestricted fare structures and send the corresponding fares to lower buckets. The
PEcost, which is not applied to the restricted fare structures, will allow decoupling the
fares which previously were in the same buckets and allow managing both structures
more independently, as shown on the Figure 28.
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Figure 28: Decoupling the Fare Structures
In this example, we replace in the bucketing process the fare Pj from the unrestricted
fare structure by the adjusted fare P3-PEcost. The fare is sent to a lower bucket which
is now closed at this point of the booking process, whereas the fare Pi is still
available.
The generalized formula for bucketing (for all legs and all kinds of markets) in the
PODS version of DAVN is now:
OD Fare - Displacement Cost - PEcost
The insertion of the MR process into DAVN is summarized on Figure 29.
I Sell-up/Frat5 ' .,, ->1 Adjusted Fares I
--- I LP
Figure 29: Insertion of MR into the DAVN Process
The LP which is solved to compute the displacement costs only sees - in the "New
Entrant" markets - the adjusted fares equal to the ODF minus the PEcost (it does not
"see" at all the ODF, like in the traditional DAVN). MR uses as secondary input the
sell-up data from the Frat5 sets.
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3.5.2. Formulation
Given the following notations:
Q=Demand
P=Price
TR=Total Revenue,
The Total Revenue is computed as follow:
TR(Q) = P(Q) x Q
And then, depending on the formulation chosen, continuous (Fiig) or discrete (Isler),
the Marginal Revenue is given by:
MR Isler TR(Q+ AQ)- TR(Q)
M g = a and MR AQ
3.5.3. PODS parameters
In PODS, we assume a negative exponential form for the demand curve. Therefore,
the Price Elasticity follows the formula:
P
In x
PE = e 2) Frat5-1
And the PEcost:
PEcost = po -Frat5-1
-nln
On the Figure 30 are represented the Marginal Revenue curves as a function of the
demand Q, assuming a negative exponential form. The PEcost can be shown as the
difference between a given fare and the Marginal Revenue associated with the
corresponding demand value. Given the configuration, the exhibited Discrete PEcost
is in this case smaller than the Continuous PEcost.
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Figure 30: Representation of the MR curves as a function of Q
From the previous graph, we can notice that we do not want to sell any ticket at a
fare lower than the one corresponding to a Marginal Revenue equal to zero (here for
Q=0.55 and Price=$500). Like in the case of Q-Forecasting, the sell-up rates are
given for the Fare Adjustment methods in terms of Frat5. The sets of Frat5 used for
these methods are different from the Q-Forecasting ones for the reasons explained
below.
3.5.4. Differences with Q-Forecasting
Sell-up is not used in the same way by both methods:
/ Frat5 for Q-Forecasting are conditional, they represent buy-up rates given
that lower classes are closed
v Frat5 for Fare Adjustment methods are unconditional, they are applied to all
booking requests regardless of the open/closure status of the different classes
Let's consider the following example by Fiig43 : assume we have two airlines A and B
in competition, and two classes, Y and Q, with respective fares fy and fQ. Let 0/1
denote if a booking class is closed/open. The system can be represented by the
states (we only consider the cases when Y is open) represented on Figure 31.
4 FIIG, Memo Price Elasticity, SAS internal document, 2005
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Y 1 1) 1 1) 1 1) 1 1)Q 1 0) 01)  1) ) 1
Figure 31: States of the system
In the real world, airline A knows only the parameters of the first column in each
matrix and the sell-up rate from Q to Y when Q is closed. In this example, we will
assume that the airline also knows the availability of its competitor (e.g. the second
column). In addition, as shown on Figure 32, for each state of the system, we know
the probability of sell-up psup and the frequency at which the state occurs (given the
RM controls of A and B).
A B psup frequency
Q 1) 0 0.05
Y 1 1
Q 0 0 0.10
Y 0 1
Q 0 0 q 0.05
(1 1( 0 0.08
Figure 32: Sell-up data
There is only one case where sell-up can occur, that is when no more Q is available,
neither in Airline A's inventory nor in Airline B's inventory. In all other cases,
passengers carry on buying Q seats as long as there are some available.
Under these assumptions and notations, the price elasticity for Q-Forecasting is
given by:
P(YA I QAclosed history)=Ip supi x freqiwhen QA closedj qx0.05 q
I freqiwhen QAclosed 0.05 +0.10 3
On contrary, the price elasticity which will be used in the fare adjustment methods is
estimated from the Marginal Revenue (discrete formulation here):
MR = TR(Q open)- TR(Q closed)
PAX(Q open)-PAX(Q closed)
where TR is the Total Revenue and PAX the number of Passengers in a given class.
If QA is open, the Total Revenue can be written as:
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TR(QA open) = PAX(QA open) -fQ ,
where PAX(QAOpen) represents the number of passengers who buy a seat to A when
QA is open.
If QA is closed, the Total Revenue is:
TR(QAclosed) = PAX(QAclosed)- fyA,
where PAX(QAClosed) represents the number of passengers who buy a seat to A
when QA is closed (so they buy a Y class ticket). It can be written as:
PAX(QA closed) = PAX(QAopen)x Pr(Y I QAclosed future)
We add the notation: p sup = Pr(Y QAclosed future)
So when QA is closed,
TR(QA closed) = PAX(QAopen) x p sup fy,
Finally, by inserting these formulas into the MR equation, we obtain:
MR = fQA psupx fy
1- psup
The sell-up rate here is not equal to the historical sell-up rate computed in the Q-
Forecasting case. The computation of the sell-up rate then depends on the degree of
knowledge of the competitor's availability.
If we assume that the competitor RMS is completely independent of A's, the
historical frequencies for the 4 states will be the future frequencies as well. If we
apply the method to
on Figure 33.
the example considered above, we obtain the results presented
Q-CLOSEL
--I I > I1 0) 0 0)
-
-I I > I0 1 (0 1)
--I > I
0 0O CA 0
(1 1) 0 1)
Psup Freq
q 0.05
0 0.10
q 0.05
0 0.80
0 0)
0 1D
FUTURE
PsupFreq
0.05
0.10
0.05
0.08
Freq
q 0.10
0 0.90
Figure 33: Sell-up rate when the RMS are independent
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In this case, the future sell-up rate is equal to q*0.1, which is very different from the
historical sell-up rate computed in the case of Q-Forecasting (it was equal to q/3).
If now we assume that both RMS are very highly correlated (the other extreme
case), it means that the competitor B mimics
both airlines will have the same availability.
example, the results are shown on Figure 34.
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the RMS of Airline A. Consequently,
Applying the concept to the same
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Figure 34: Sell-up rate when the RMS are highly correlated
In this case, the future sell-up rate will be equal to q*0.9, which is again very
different from the historical sell-up rate computed previously.
All degrees of correlation between both airlines are possible, and can be modeled
easily. This concludes the section aimed to show that sell-up rates can be different
when we deal with Q-Forecasting from when we deal with Fare Adjustment methods.
In his Memo, Fig4 3 shows as well the correspondence between the discrete and
continuous price elasticity.
Both processes - QF and FA - are not totally independent, but are complementary,
and we will see in the next section that the airlines benefit from using both
simultaneously with DAVN. The insertion of both processes is schematized on Figure
35.
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Figure 35: Insertion of MR and QF into the DAVN process
The historical database is used for the forecasting and sell-up estimations, optimally
in both Q-Forecasting and Fare Adjustment methods. On the Forecasting side, Q-
Forecasting is inserted at the very beginning of the process. On the Fare Adjustment
side, the adjustment occurs as well very early in the process, before subtracting the
displacement cost since that the LP solved to compute them uses the adjusted fares.
Then, the "MR+Displacement adjusted" fares are sent into the optimizer with the
forecasts to compute the booking limits.
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4. Simulation Results
This chapter is divided in four sections. The first one presents quickly the spiral-down
effect in the networks we will use. Then, the section 4.2 summarizes the results
obtained with Q-Forecasting. The next one presents the performance of the Fare-
Adjustment methods, and the last section details the benefits obtained from the
combination of both methods.
4.1. Traditional RM in Unrestricted Environments: Spiral-
Down Effect
4.1.1. Performance in the Single Market Case
In order to simulate a sudden change ("shock") in restrictions - from a fully
restricted fare product to a fully unrestricted fare product - the burn-in process of
PODS (first 200 samples of each trial) was modified. In a specific version, we are
allowed to change the fare product starting from the 2 0 1 st sample so that the new
fare product is used for the 400 last samples, which account for the reported results.
This has been tested in the single market case:
/ 2 carriers
/ 3 flights per day
v Various Demand Factors (DF) corresponding to the following Average Load
Factors
DF=0.8 means 65% ALF for EMSRb without shock
DF=0.9 means 73% ALF for EMSRb without shock
DF=1.0 means 77% ALF for EMSRb without shock
We are in the case of 4 fare classes, following the example of Table 9.
Class Y B M Q
Fare $625 $295 $185 $125
Table 9: 4-Fare-class Price Structure
Both airlines in these cases will use standard advance purchase requirements, and
the fare products, before and after the shock, are structured as shown respectively
in Table 10 and Table 11.
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TF R1 R2 R3
16 0 0 0
12 1 0 0
10 1 1 0
8 1 1 1
Table 10: Restricted Fare Product in the 4-Fare-Class Case
TF R1 R2 R3
16 0 0 0
12 0 0 0
10 0 0 0
8 0 0 0
Table 11: Unrestricted Fare Product in the 4-Fare-Class Case
In all cases below, Airline 1 and Airline 2 undergo the shock in their fare products.
Given the symmetry in their results, only the performance of Airline 1 will be
reported here.
On Figure 36 is represented Airline 1's revenue (USD) per day (3 flights in the single
market case) when the shock occurs, computed for each of the 600 samples of a
particular trial. The black curve is a moving average over 30 departure days.
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Figure 36: Trend in Airline 1's Revenue when a shock occurs at sample 200
As one can notice, the shock induces a drop in revenue by 21% on average, and the
airline does not recover from this decrease in the next samples. On Figure 37 is
shown the revenue of Airline 1 without and with shock, for 3 different values of the
Demand Factor.
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Figure 37: Revenue of AL1 as a Function of Demand Factor, Without and With Shock
Irrespective of the Demand Factor value, the drop in revenue caused by the shock in
the restriction represents a decrease by 21%.
Finally, on Figure 38, we present a comparison of various cases: EMSRb vs. EMSRb
without shock, EMSRb vs. EMSRb with shock, FCFS vs. FCFS with shock, and EMSRb
vs EMSRb with shock and the Belobaba-Weatherford Sell-up algorithm ("SU" on the
figure) we have mentioned in Chapter 3.
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Figure 38: Revenue of AL1 With Various RM Methods
Again, we notice the decrease in revenue in the case of EMSRb when the shock
occurs (first two bars), but it is interesting to consider the effect of the Belobaba-
Weatherford sell-up algorithm, which allows recovering a small amount of the drop in
revenue. The decrease is reduced from -21% to - 1 8 % when the sell-up algorithm is
used. Nevertheless, this is not enough to recover the entire losses.
4.1.2. Performance in Network D
In this section we will briefly mention the results obtained by Gorin4 4 regarding the
removal of restrictions and advance purchase requirements in the environment of
the network D when a Low-cost airline enters 10 non-stop markets and competes
with the Airline 1 in these local markets.
The environment is that of Network D as described in Chapter 3, with and without
new entrant, with removal of restrictions and advance purchase requirements, as
well as compression of fare ratios for the 3 airlines in the 10 markets.
Consider the case when both network carriers are using EMSRb. When the LCC
enters the 10 markets using EMSRb and the incumbents match restrictions and
advance purchase requirements, the revenues of Airline 1 decrease by 8% on
average, from $1,235,000 down to $1,135,000. This illustrates and somewhat
44 Gorin, Assessing Low-Fare Entry in Airline Markets: Impact of Revenue Management and Network
Flows, PhD Thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 2004
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quantifies the spiral-down effect in this particular case. Looking at the local loads in
the 10 markets, we notice that bookings actually dropped in Y, B and M classes,
whereas Q bookings increased by 140% (buy-down phenomenon due to the removal
of the fences between fare products - restrictions and advance purchase
requirements).
If we compare with the exact same case except that Airline 1 uses DAVN, we notice
that the advantage brought by DAVN over EMSRb is still the same in terms of
percent as it was without LCC: revenues increase by 1.54 %. In the next sections,
DAVN will generally be the reference for the RM methods.
4.2. Performance of Q-Forecasting (QF)
This section is divided in two sub-sections. In the first one, we will analyze the
performance of the Q-Forecasting (QF) method based on Frat5 values that we set as
input before running PODS. In the second sub-section, we will show the performance
of the sell-up estimator, which dynamically estimates the Frat5 values during the
run, and compare it with the results obtained in the first sub-section. The use of QF
with input Frat5 by an airline will be generally reflected in the graphs with diagonal
stripes, while the use of QF with the sell-up estimator will be emphasized by
horizontal stripes.
4.2.1. Input
In this entire sub-section, we will only consider the Network D (cf. section 3.1.2) in
the "new entrant" configuration introduced above. Airline 1 will be the only airline
which will use the Q-Forecasting method (apart from the LCC when it uses EMSRQ2,
but we will not comment the effects of the forecasting method on this airline). The
Frat5 set used in this subsection is the "B" set (cf. 3.4.3), which is a medium-
aggressive set.
Consider the case when AL1 and AL2 are using DAVN, AL3 (LCC) is using EMSRb
(very basic RM especially in unrestricted environments), and the Demand Factor is
set to 1. On Figure 39 is shown the impact of the entrance of the LCC in the network
on AL1 and AL2's revenues, first when AL1 uses traditional PU forecasting, and then
when it uses Q-Forecasting.
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Figure 39: Impact of Q-Forecasting on AL1 and AL2 Revenues
As previously shown, the entrance of the LCC in the 10 markets causes a decrease in
revenue for AL1 by 8.1% when it matches its competitor (but still uses Pick-up - PU
- forecasting). When AL1 switches to Q-Forecasting, the drop in revenue is reduced
to 7.4% with respect to the case when there is no LCC. In other terms, considering
only the case of Network D with 3 airlines, when AL1 changes from PU to QF, its
revenues increase by 0.62% from $1,143,400 to $1,150,470. If AL2 suffers from the
entrance of the LCC (-0.46% in revenues), we see that the impact of AL1 using QF is
not really significant (-0.49% in revenues when AL1 switches to QF).
Figure 40 highlights the effect of QF on the average load factors (across
networks) of the 3 airlines, under the same conditions as in the previous graph.
their
E No LCC O With LCC 0 With LCC + QF
x
AL1 - DAVN AL2 - DAVN AL3-EMSRb
Figure 40: Impact of Q-Forecasting on AL1, AL2 and AL3 Network Loads
The loads of AL1 increase very slightly in the cases when it competes with the LCC.
On contrary, AL2's loads decrease slightly. Like AL1, AL3's loads increase, but very
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significantly this time, when AL1 changes from PU to QF (AL3 captures many Q
passengers denied by AL1 due to QF).
In order to understand the changes in AL1's loads, we focus now on the passengers
the airline carries on the 10 legs where it competes with the LCC. We can see on
Figure 41 the local passengers of AL1 (opposed to connecting passengers).
ENo LCC 0With LCC
B M
Ci With LCC + QF
Q
Figure 41: Impact of Q-Forecasting on AL1 Local Loads in the NEM
The QF method worked as predicted. After the drop in all classes caused by the
entrance of the LCC, QF helps protecting more higher-class seats (increase in Y, B
and M), while reducing the number of Q bookings. On the contrary, the LCC's Q loads
increase as we noticed on Figure 40. Yet this did not explain the increase in ALl's
network loads; so let's consider the breakdown of the loads on these 10 legs with
respect to local and connecting passengers (Figure 42).
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Figure 42: Impact of Q-Forecasting on AL1 Passenger Types in the NEM
If the number of local passengers has decreased (by 4 .6 %) as we saw previously
when AL1 switches from PU to QF, the number of connecting passengers increases
on these legs by 1.8%, especially when AL1 uses QF. Therefore, on total, the loads
increase with respect to the base case. The breakdown of the connecting passengers
would also show that AL1 carries more Y, B and M connecting passengers with
respect to Q connecting passengers. So AL1 also benefits from QF at the network
level. Other network effects would probably explain why the network loads increase
slightly between PU and QF while total loads in the NEM decrease slightly (-0.3%) at
the same time.
Figure 43 and Figure 44 show the Q and
Frames) when AL1 is using PU and when
connecting passengers.
Y booking curves (as a function of Time-
AL1 is using QF, differentiating local and
69
31.49
With LCC + QF
30.4
+4.0%
No LCC
13 Locals
-- AL1=QF, Local pax
A- AL1=PU, Local pax
--- AL1=QF, Connecting
-u-AL1=PU, Connecting
PU
PU=QF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Time Frame
Figure 43: Daily Number of Bookings for AL1 in Q Class
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Figure 44: Daily Number of Bookings for AL1 in Y Class
In Q class, we see that QF has prevented some local bookings after TF7 , very early
the process. Regarding the Y class, we notice that QF allowed some extra bookings
the very last time-frames for both local and connecting passengers.
in
in
So Q-Forecasting increased AL1's revenue by 0.62%, and worked by protecting more
seats for high-classes (Y, B and M), denying more Q-booking requests. It was
applied to local passengers, for whom AL1 competes with the LCC, but its impact
also affected connecting passengers, given that more seats are available for them in
the aircraft due to the presence of the new entrant, which captures more local
passengers.
We consider now the Revenue Management method used by the LCC. In the previous
graphs, we saw the case when it was using EMSRb. As said in the previous sections,
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EMSRb in unrestricted environments leads inevitably to a spiral-down in revenues.
So we want here to check if Q-Forecasting also improves AL1 revenues when the LCC
is using for instance the Fixed Threshold RM method (with thresholds set to
.75/.60/.45). Again in this case, AL1 and AL2 are using DAVN, the demand factor is
set to 1.0, and ALl's input Frat5 is "B". We present on Figure 45 the Revenue change
when AL1 switches from PU to QF, for AL1 and AL3, given AL3's RM method.
HAL1 3AL3
+0.62%
AL1
1180000-
1160000-
1140000-
1120000-
1100000-
1080000-
1060000-
1040000 -
1020000 -
1000000 -
Figure 45: Impact of the LCC's RM on ALl's Revenue Gains Due to QF
The first line of the X axis refers to the forecasting method used by AL1,
the second line refers to AL3's RM
The first 2 sets of columns act as a reminder of the results we have already shown.
The other 2 sets represent the equivalent results when the LCC is using FT instead of
EMSRb. As shown, the benefits of QF for AL1 are slightly higher in this second case
(+0.72% increase in AL1's revenues), while AL3 is not taking advantage from this
change. The corresponding ALF are not very different from the values shown in the
case when AL3 was using EMSRb, except that AL1's loads are slightly higher when
AL3 is using FT.
Looking at AL1 and AL3's fare class mixes for the local passengers in the 10 NEM
(Figure 46), we notice the same mechanisms as for the EMSRb case. AL1 is
protecting more high-class seats and denies more Q booking requests, while AL3's
loads are declining very slightly, especially in the highest classes.
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Figure 46: Impact of QF on AL1 and AL3 Local Loads when AL3 uses FT
In fact, similar impacts are observed when AL1 uses QF, whether AL3 uses FT, AT,
EMSRb or EMSRQ2 (as introduced in sub-section 3.1.5). Only the amplitude of the
improvement varies slightly from one case to the other. When AL3 uses EMSRQ2 for
instance, the increase in AL1 revenue is reduced to 0.5 4 %. EMSRQ2 is indeed more
adapted to unrestricted environments than EMSRb, thus the LCC is more effectively
competing against the incumbent.
Another case we wanted to consider is when AL1 switches to other RM for which QF
is applicable, for instance ProBP and HBP. Figure 47 shows the benefits of QF for AL1
when the airline applies QF to DAVN, HBP and ProBP. In this case, AL2 uses EMSRb
and AL3 uses EMSRQ2. The Demand Factor and the Frat5 sets remain the same.
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Figure 47: Impact of AL1 's RM on the Revenue Gains Due to QF With Respect to
EMSRb/EMSRb/EMSRQ2
The first line of the X axis refers to the forecasting method used by AL1,
the second line refers to its RM method.
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The benefits of QF are not very sensitive to AL1's RM method, even if they are a little
higher when AL1 uses HBP and ProBP than they were with DAVN. Overall, the
benefits remain in the range of an increase by 0.55 to 0.60% in revenue.
The last relevant sensitivity to analyze regarding the QF-input method is the impact
of the Frat5 values we are using as inputs. So we are now considering a less
aggressive set of Frat5 - "D" - which should protect fewer seats for the highest
classes. The most aggressive set of Frat5 is not necessarily the set which leads to
the highest revenue. Remember the goal is to protect enough seats for high-fare,
late-booking passengers, but also to avoid flying empty seats, which would in the
end lead to a decrease in revenue. So we do not want necessarily to be too
aggressive regarding the Frat5 values.
In this case, we consider AL1 using DAVN, AL2 using EMSRb and AL3 using EMSRQ2,
for a Demand Factor of 1.0. Figure 48 is just a reminder of the Frat5 sets shapes as
a function of time-frame. The less aggressive set is indeed below the other.
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Figure 48: Frat5 sets "B" and "D" as a function of Time-Frame
Given these sets, we consider Figure 49, on
revenue when the input Frat5 is modified.
which are presented the change in ALl's
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Figure 49: Impact of a change in Frat5 on AL1 and AL3 Revenues
The graph shows that the improvement provided by QF is lower for the Frat5 set "D",
which happens to be too flat and therefore protects fewer seats for the higher
classes. Nevertheless, it still represents an increase in revenue by 0.43% with
respect to PU forecasting.
4.2.2. Estimator
Following the previous sub-section, our main interest is in the impact of QF in
Network D. Nevertheless, some of the simulations were done in the single market
case, especially the sensitivity analyses which require a lot of runs. So we will
present some results in both the single Market case and in the case of Network D.
We consider first the Single Market case, for which Table 12 summarizes the
comparison in terms of performance between several RM methods. We deal again
with an unrestricted environment (no advance purchase requirement either), and 8
fare classes as described in sub-section 3.2.2. In a given row of the table, which
corresponds to a given RM method (with asterisk), we compare, in terms of revenue
gains with respect to FCFS, which RM used by the competitor (columns) performs
best. In this case, the sell-up estimator is used by EMSRQ2 as specified in the table.
FT AT EMSRb EMSRQ2-Est
FT* +35% +35% +3% +43%
AT* +36% +37% +3% +44%
EMSRb* +48% +52% +0% +10%
EMSRQ2-Input* +32% +28% +1% +28%
Table 12: Revenue Gains of Each RM Method with Respect to FCFS
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We notice that depending on the RM*, there is no unique RM which performs best
against all methods. Nevertheless, QF with sell-up estimator performs best against
FT and AT, the most common RM methods used by LCC today, increasing revenues
up to 44% with respect to FCFS, and it does well against EMSRQ2. The method is
therefore competitive with respect to other ones presented here. It only does not
perform well against EMSRb because in this environment, its competitor's revenues
spiral-down and the estimator is unable to estimate sell-up rate.
We now return to Network D to analyze in more detail the performance of the sell-up
estimator with respect to PU forecasting and with respect to QF with input Frat5. AL1
and AL2 are now both using DAVN, and AL3 is using FT (Thresholds at .75/.60/.45).
The demand Factor is set to 1.0. Figure 50 presents the revenue gains with respect
to PU forecasting provided by QF-Input (QF with Input Frat5 "B") and QF-Est (QF
with Sell-up Estimator) when the LCC uses FT or EMSRQ2.
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Figure 50: Performance of the Sell-up Estimator in Terms of Revenues
In the case when AL3 uses FT, the sell-up estimator leads to an increase in revenue
by 0.58%, which is slightly below the gains provided by QF-Input, but nevertheless
significant. The benefits amplitudes are lower in the case when the LCC uses
EMSRQ2, but the same ranking is observed between QF-Est and QF-Input. AL3
indeed increases significantly its revenues when it uses EMSRQ2 relative to FT, so
the improvements in AL1 revenues are lower.
In order to highlight the involved mechanisms and compare with those of QF-Input,
we observe the corresponding loads on the 10 legs (case AL3=FT) and especially the
breakdown between local and connecting passengers, as presented on Figure 51.
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Figure 51: Impact of the Estimator on AL1 Local and Connecting Pax in the NEM
We notice that the exact same things happen, which are the decrease in local
passengers and the increase in connecting passengers. The decrease in local
passengers corresponds to a significant decrease in local Q passengers which
outweighs the increase in local high-class passengers. On the other hand, the
increase in connecting passengers is due to an increase in connecting high-fare-class
passengers on these legs. These phenomena are shown on the following Figure 52
and Figure 53.
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Figure 52: AL1 Local Loads in the NEM
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Figure 53: AL1 Connecting Loads in the NEM
In the next graph - Figure 54 - we will compare the Estimated Frat5 with the typical
Frat5 set that we were using in the QF-Input cases ("B").
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Figure 54: Estimated Frat5 Compared with Medium Input
As we can observe, the estimated Frat5 values are lower than the input values.
Notice that the reported estimated values are averaged over time-frames since that
they are computed at each of them. We point out also that the shape is not the
same. We do not recognize the "S" shape which characterizes the input Frat5, but we
observe a very flat curve until TF13 when it starts increasing slightly more
significantly. This corresponds to the booking curve shape, which shows some extra
bookings in Y, B and M classes in the last time frames.
We now come back to the Single Market case in order to analyze the Demand Factor
sensitivity. To do this, we consider AL1 using EMSRQ2 with QF and the sell-up
estimator, and AL2 using various RM methods. The fare products are unrestricted for
both airlines (8 fare classes), and there is no advance purchase requirement. Figure
55 presents the curves of AL1's revenue as a function of DF, against the different RM
methods its competitor uses (FT, AT, EMSRQ2 - with input Frat5 "B" - and EMSRb).
77
60000-
55000
50000
45000 -- vs FT
40000-vs AT
vs EMSRQ2
35000 
-vs EMSRb
30000
25000
20000
0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15
Figure 55: Sensitivity to Demand Factor in terms of Revenues
As expected, the revenues increase when demand increases. We see that the
estimator performs best against FT and AT, whatever the Demand Factor is. Against
EMSRQ2, the performance is below the others, given that this RM is more
sophisticated than the Threshold methods, so both methods compete for the high
fare passengers with equivalent tools, and in the end, they have to share. Against
EMSRb, the problem is different. In unrestricted environments, EMSRb behaves
almost like FCFS. Therefore, all passengers book the lowest fares which are available
for a long period of time in ALl's inventory, and the estimator does not observe
enough occurrences of sell-up. Thus, given the mechanisms of the estimator, it
cannot predict high sell-up rates and in the end protects few seats for the high-fare
classes. We also notice that the ranking between methods is not changed when the
demand increases.
Figure 56 is the corresponding graph in terms of ALl's load factor. Again, as
predicted, the ALF increases when the demand increases. At lower demand factor
(0.85 to 0.95), EMSRQ2 with sell-up estimator captures more passengers against FT
than against other RM methods, but starting from DF=0.95, EMSRQ2's loads are
almost equal, whether competing against FT, AT or EMSRb. Against EMSRQ2 with
input Frat5, again, both RM methods behave the same way, they focus on higher
fare passengers, and compete for them in priority, denying more Q booking requests
since sell-up occurs often.
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Figure 56: Sensitivity of Demand Factor in terms of Loads
In order to understand the mechanisms behind the increase in revenues, we observe
in more detail ALl's fare class mix evolution when the demand factor increases, as
presented on Figure 57.
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Figure 57: AL1 Fare Mix Trend as a Function of DF
This graph presents a good illustration of how the Q-Forecasting method works: as
demand increases, the number of high-fare passengers also increases, so sell-up
occurrences are more frequent. The consequence is that estimated Frat5 values rise
too, and AL1 is protecting more seats for high fare-class passengers. This translates
on the graph into a significant decrease in loads of classes 7 and 8, while classes 1 to
6 see their loads increase quite substantially, as indicated by the arrows. The
increase is even significant in classes 1 and 2.
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Figure 58: Changes in Frat5 (as a Function of TF) When DF Increases
In concordance with the previous observations, when the demand increases, the
number of high fare class passengers rises, the frequency of observed sell-up rises,
and the estimator predicts higher Frat5 values to protect more seats for late-
booking, high-fare passengers.
4.2.3. Conclusion
The Q-Forecasting method improves the performance of traditional revenue
management methods (DAVN, ProBP, HBP) in unrestricted environments by
increasing their total network revenues on average by 0.60% in the cases considered
in this section. It corresponds to an increase in revenue in the 10 NEM by 8.8%. The
magnitude of the improvement depends on the demand level and on the LCC's
Revenue Management method as well. The Q-Forecasting method actually protects
more seats for high-fare, late-booking passengers in the 10 legs where the LCC
entered, as well as for the connecting passengers flying on these legs, implying a
non-negligible network effect. The sell-up estimator, even if it cannot exactly reach
the performance of specific input Frat5 sets, performs relatively well in comparison,
which is crucial given that only an estimator can work in the real world (where one
does not want to have to enter arbitrary input Frat5 sets which should be different
for each market and departure).
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4.3. Performance of Fare-Adjustment Methods (FA)
In this section, we will analyze the performance and mechanisms of the Fare
Adjustment methods, without using the Q-Forecasting method (see section 4.4 for
combinations of both methods). Given the complexity in the number of adjustable
parameters, and the similarities between methods, we will consider in this thesis
only the KI Fare Adjustment method using the time-frame sell-up constant. The
other methods (KI with BTC sell-up constant, MR with TF sell-up constant and MR
with BTC sell-up constant) give approximately the same results and the mechanisms
they involve are almost the same. There is no sell-up estimation properly
implemented at this point in PODS in order to dynamically predict the Frat5 values
for the Fare Adjustment methods, so we will focus on the use of input Frat5. The use
of the FA method will be generally emphasized in the next figures by vertical stripes.
4.3.1. Input Frat5 values
As shown in section 3.5.4, the sell-up considered in the case of Fare Adjustment is
"unconditional" whereas it is conditioned on the closure of the Q-class in the case of
Q-Forecasting. Therefore, the Frat5 values used for Fare Adjustment methods have
to be much lower than those used for Q-Forecasting. That is the reason why we
define here some very simple (linear) Frat5 sets, named after low-case letters in
order to distinguish them from the QF Frat5 sets (from h to z). Figure 59 presents
the shapes of these Frat5, and Table 13 the value of the each Frat5 set at TF1 and
TF16 .
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Figure 59: Fare Adjustment Frat5 Curves as a Function of Time-Frame
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We will first analyze in detail the results obtained with one given set of Frat5 ("k"),
which is the Frat5 sets which provided the best results, before looking at the
sensitivity to a change in Frat5.
4.3.2. Impact of Fare Adjustment Methods on DAVN
We consider the case of Network D with the LCC entering the 10 non-stop markets,
complying with the description given in sub-section 3.2 in terms of fare products (no
restriction, no advance purchase requirements, and compressed fare ratios). AL1
uses DAVN without QF, AL2 uses DAVN, and AL3 uses AT with a target load factor of
80%. The FA method is applied to AL1, in the 10 NEM only, and uses the Input Frat5
"k" (which varies linearly from 1.3 to 2.0) described in the previous sub-section. The
Demand Factor is set to 1. On Figure 60 is presented the impact of the FA method on
AL1 and AL3's revenues relative to the case when AL1 does not use FA ("base case").
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Figure 60: Impact of the FA Method on AL1 and AL3 Revenues
The utilization of the Fare Adjustment method by AL1 with DAVN allows the airline to
increase its total network revenue by 0.18%. We will see later that the range of the
revenue improvement, like in the case of Q-Forecasting, varies depending on the
Frat5 set used as input. As one can notice, the new entrant benefits from the FA (its
revenue increases by 2.01 %). The corresponding network average load factors for
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both airlines increase as well, by 0.20% for AL1 and by 1.57% for AL3. We will see in
more detail how the method worked in the following graphs.
Like we did in the case of QF, we observe the effect of the FA method on the loads
on the 10 affected legs. On Figure 61 is shown the impact on ALl's connecting and
local passengers, as well as AL3's local passengers.
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Figure 61: Impact of the FA Method on the Local/Connecting Passengers
Looking at AL1 total loads on these legs, we notice a slight decrease in passengers
by 0. 5 3 %. But if we consider the breakdown relative to connecting and local
passengers, we realize again that the method did not act the same way on both
categories. The local loads decreased by 6.93% whereas the number of connecting
passengers increased by 3.04%. Thus, we observe, like in the case of Q-Forecasting,
some non-negligible network effects. The loads of AL3 increased at the same time by
1.55%. Figure 62 and Figure 63 present another breakdown of ALl's passengers
traveling on these legs: the change in (respectively) local and connecting passengers
fare mixes.
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Figure 63: Impact of the FA Method on AL1 Connecting Loads in the NEM
The changes in local loads are similar to the ones observed
leads to a decrease in Q bookings, whereas it increases the
classes. On contrary, regarding connecting passengers, the
increase in all fare classes loads, even in Q.
for QF. The FA method
bookings in Y, B and M
FA method leads to an
To understand the mechanisms of the method, we observe the graph of the adjusted
fares (= ODF-PEcost) for the 4 classes, as a function of Time-Frame, shown on
Figure 64. The values reported here are averaged adjusted fares of the actual
adjusted fares on the 10 legs. The Y fare is not adjusted, so it does not vary.
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Figure 64: AL1 Adjusted Fares in the NEM
The graph shows that the adjustment changes during the booking process. This
observation complies with the fact that the Frat5 values vary as well. The adjusted
fares decrease as we approach the departure date, meaning that we send them into
lower buckets, which are closed earlier. In other terms, the lower the adjusted cost
is, the earlier the corresponding booking request will be denied. The adjustments
applied here are very similar, in terms of amount of money, from one class to the
other. The Y class, to which the adjustment is not applied, will benefit from the
earlier closure of the lower classes. The Q-class is almost closed down by the method
at TF16.
4.3.3. Sensitivity to Input Frat5
Like in the case of Q-Forecasting, it is interesting to observe the impact of a change
in the Frat5 values. So we run several times the same network with the different
input Frat5 presented in section 4.3.1, from h (the most aggressive set) to z. On
Figure 65 is shown the evolution of ALl's revenue when the aggressiveness of the
Frat5 decreases.
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Figure 65: Sensitivity to FA Frat5
The sensitivity analysis shows the presence of a maximum in ALl's revenue -
$1,148,295 for the Frat5 set "k" (whose values go from 1.3 to 2.0). In the base case
(No FA), the revenue of AL1 was $1,146,207, which is approximately the level
reached here for the Frat5 r to z. The maximum represents an increase by 0.18%
with respect to the base case. We notice that the revenue drops very fast when we
increase the aggressiveness from set k (left hand side of the graph). On contrary, for
less aggressive Frat5, we reach a plateau at the level of the base case (No Fare
Adjustment, no Q-Forecasting).
In order to understand the previous graph, we observe how the adjusted fares in the
10 NEM change when the Frat5 become more or less aggressive. On Figure 66,
Figure 67 and Figure 68, we see the averaged adjusted fares respectively for the B,
M and Q classes. The darker the line, the less aggressive the Frat5. The curves
corresponding to the Frat5 "k" (optimal found in this analysis) are thicker.
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Figure 66: Adjusted B Fares in the 10 NEM
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Figure 67: Adjusted M Fares in the 10 NEM
z
'Aggressi-
veness
rdecreases
k
j
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Figure 68: Adjusted Q Fares in the 10 NEM
For a given fare class, the adjusted fares decrease when the Frat5 become more
aggressive (what we observe when we slice one of these graphs for a given Time-
Frame). The aim being to protect more seats for the higher classes, lower adjusted
fares make the class unavailable. For the less aggressive sets (r to z), the
adjustments are almost not visible, and the effects are not significant with respect to
the base case. Consequently, the corresponding revenues are at the same level as
the base case. On contrary, the most aggressive Frat5 are very aggressive, even
reducing the M and Q fares to $0. As a consequence, the lower classes are closed
down early, probably too early, and too many seats are protected for the highest
classes. Thus, revenues drop fast. The optimum Frat5 set "k" is a tradeoff between
both extreme cases.
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4.3.4. Conclusion
The Fare Adjustment methods help improving DAVN in unrestricted environments, by
increasing its total network revenue by about 0.20% with respect to the case "No QF
/ No FA" under the conditions considered in this section. Again, it corresponds to an
increase by 3% in the 10 NEM. The revenue is quite sensitive to the input Frat5
around the optimal set. The method actually decreases the local fares in the
unrestricted environment before running the optimizer and sends them in lower
buckets which are closed earlier to protect more seats for the high-fare customers.
The magnitude of the decrease in adjusted fares depends on the input Frat5.
4.4. Combination of Q-Forecasting and Fare Adjustment
Methods
4.4.1. Using the same Input Frat5
Before examining the differences between the Frat5 for Q-Forecasting and the Frat5
for Fare Adjustment methods, we used the same set for both methods. On Figure 69
are shown the Frat5 sets which will be used in this section.
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Figure 69: Frat5 Sets Used For Both QF and FA Methods
Figure 70 presents the results obtained in terms of AL1 and AL3 revenues for the
case DAVN/DAVN/AT (with target load factor at 80%) at demand level 1.0 when the
same Frat5 set - . - is used by both methods.
88
M AL1=DAVN OAL3=AT
+0.410/
Base Case FA-JJ
Figure 70: Revenue of AL1 and AL2 When AL1 Uses Frat5 Set "J" For QF and FA
The use of both Q-Forecasting and Fare Adjustment
Frat5 leads to an increase in AL1's revenue by 0.41%,
At the same time, AL3 improves its revenue by 2.68%.
presents the breakdown of ALl and AL3 loads on the
connecting passengers.
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which is a good improvement.
The next figure - Figure 71 -
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Figure 71: AL1 and AL3 Local and Connecting Passengers
AL1 total loads on the 10 legs increased by 0.73%. Nevertheless, the effects of
QF+FA were not the same on both local and connecting passengers. The local loads
decreased by 5.75% whereas the connecting increased by 4.35%. Given that the
latter are more numerous, the total results into an increase in loads. Simultaneously,
AL3 increased its loads by 1.55%.
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Figure 72 and Figure 73 present ALl's loads on the 10 legs in terms of fare class
mixes, respectively for the local and for the connecting passengers.
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Figure 72: AL1 Local Passengers Fare Class Mix on the 10 Legs
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Figure 73: AL1 Connecting Passengers Fare Class Mix on the 10 Legs
Like in the case when only the Fare Adjustment method was applied, we observe a
significant decrease in Q local passengers, whereas the Y, B and M loads increase.
Regarding connecting passengers, the loads increase in all fare classes, leading to
the total increase observed on Figure 71.
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We show on Figure 74 the behavior of Adjusted Fares across time-frames, for the 4
fare classes.
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Figure 74: Adjusted Fares of AL1 in the 10 NEM
The Adjusted Fares decrease as time goes, and we recognize in the slope of the
curve a relation with the opposite of the Frat5 slope. None fare class was closed
down due directly to Fare Adjustment method in this case, even if the adjustments
are more significant than the ones we observed in the previous section.
We analyze now the sensitivity to the Input Frat5, observing on ALl's revenue
change relative to the Frat5 presented on Figure 69.
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Figure 75: Evolution of AL1 Revenue When Frat5 Sets Vary From A to L
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The first bar on the graph represents ALl's revenue in the base case - No QF /No FA.
In the other cases, the letter corresponds to the Frat5 set used by both Q-
Forecasting and Fare Adjustment methods. We observe a bell-shape with a
maximum in revenue obtained for the Frat5 set "J". This case, as presented above,
represents an increase by 0.41% in revenue with respect to the base case. Around
the optimal set, the revenues quickly drop below the base case level. On Figure 76,
Figure 77 and Figure 78 are shown the corresponding adjusted fares, respectively for
the B, M and Q fares.
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Figure 76: AL1 Adjusted B Fares in the 10 NEM
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Figure 77: AL1 Adjusted M Fares in the 10 NEM
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Figure 78: AL1 Adjusted Fares in the 10 NEM
The adjusted fares are globally lower than the graphs we observed in the case of the
Fare Adjustment methods used alone, given that the Frat5 sets are more aggressive
in this case. Consequently, in many cases, the Q, M and even B classes are closed
down directly by the Fare Adjustment method, very early in the booking process.
This leads to the pretty low revenues we observed on Figure 75. The Frat5 set "J" is
emphasized on each graph with a thicker line.
On Figure 79, we consider the case when AL1 uses the FA method with different sets
of Input Frat5 (the sets are shown on Figure 80). We observe then the benefits
provided by the additional use of Q-Forecasting (again with the same input Frat5 as
the FA method). We notice that in all cases, QF allows an improvement in ALl's
revenue, even if it does not reach the revenue obtained by QF with Input "A" alone.
The benefits of QF are more significant when the Frat5 set is aggressive (sets "A"
and "C") than when the Frat5 are more adapted to FA alone (sets "E", "F" and "G").
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Figure 79: ALl's Revenue Sensitivity
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Figure 80: Frat5 sets used as input in the Figure 79
The problem pointed out by these graphs is that even if obviously the use of both Q-
Forecasting and Fare Adjustment methods benefits to DAVN in unrestricted
environments, we clearly do not reach the optimal case when using the same input
Frat5 for both methods. The optimal Frat5 for Q-Forecasting is quite aggressive, and
when we add the Fare Adjustment method using the same Frat5, revenues drop
under the base case level. Symmetrically, the optimal Frat5 for is the Fare
Adjustment method quite flat, and when we add the Q-Forecasting using the same
Frat5, revenues drop under the base case level too. The highest revenue obtained
when both method use the same Frat5 set is still under the highest revenue obtained
with Q-forecasting alone. The corresponding Frat5 set is at an intermediate level
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between the optimal - but aggressive - Frat5 set used for Q-Forecasting alone and
the optimal - but very flat - Frat5 set used for Fare Adjustment methods alone.
4.4.2. Matrices of inputs
In order to look for a combined benefit from the Q-Forecasting method and from the
Fare Adjustment method, we have added in PODS the possibility to use different
Frat5 sets for each method. Therefore, we are able to apply relatively high Frat5 to
QF, while FA uses lower values because, as explained in Chapter 3, the FA-Sell-up is
not conditioned on the closure of the Q-Class (therefore sell-up rates are lower). We
are considering here the Frat5 sets presented on Figure 81 and on Figure 82.
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Figure 81: QF Time-Frame Frat5 Sets Used in the Matrices
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Figure 82: FA Time-Frame Frat5 Sets Used in the Matrices
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Figure 83 presents the change in AL1 revenue when the QF Frat5 sets vary from Y to
I and the FA Frat5 sets vary from n to v.
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Figure 83: AL1 Revenue Depending on QF and FA Frat5
The obtained "surface" presents a large "plateau" for all QF Frat5 inputs more
aggressive than sets G and F. There is little sensitivity on this surface, and generally
little sensitivity with respect to the FA Frat5. The revenue obtained in the base case
(No QF / No FA) for the same conditions is $1,146,207. The best total network
revenue obtained in the matrix above reaches $1,153,461 (sets A,r), which is 0.630/0
(equals 9.2% revenue increase in the 10 NEM) above the base case.
96
In order to analyze the impacts of a change in the demand, we change the demand
Factor from 1.0 down to 0.9 on Figure 84, and from 1.0 up to 1.1 on Figure 85,
everything else remaining equal.
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Figure 84: Impact of a Decrease in Demand (DF= 0.9)
Again, the surface as a plateau shape, with the same zone of low-sensitivity to both
input Frat5. ALl total network revenues in the base case (No-QF / No-FA, and
DF=0.9) were $1,052,650 whereas the optimal of this matrix reaches $1,058,207
(sets Y,v) which is 0.530/ higher (equals 7.8% revenue increase in the 10 NEM).
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Figure 85: Impact of an Increase in Demand (DF= 1.1)
Again, the surface as a plateau shape, with the same zone of low-sensitivity to both
input Frat5. AL1 revenues in the base case (No-QF / No-FA, and DF=1.1) were
$1,229,680 whereas the optimal of this matrix reaches $1,238,714 (sets E,r) which
is 0.73% higher (equals 10.7% revenue increase in the 10 NEM). We observe that
the optimal Frat5 couple is less aggressive at higher demand, given that it is easier
to capture more high-fare class passengers at high demand.
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This time we consider another parameter, the capacity of the New Entrant that we
decrease from 30 seats down to 20 seats. On Figure 86 we see the impact on ALl's
revenue.
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Figure 86: Impact of a Decrease in the LCC's Capacity (from 30 to 20)
Once again, the surface as a plateau shape, with the same zone of low-sensitivity to
both input Frat5. AL1 revenues in the base case (No-QF / No-FA, LCC=20 seats)
were $1,151,422 whereas the optimal of this matrix reaches $1,161,008 (sets B,n)
which is 0.83% higher (equals 12.2% revenue increase in the 10 NEM).
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4.4.3. Conclusion
On Table 14 is presented a summary of the results obtained in this section. It
regroups, in each case, the corresponding base case and best case total network
revenues, the improvement in % and the Frat5 couples to which the best case
refers.
DF=0.9 DF=1.0 DF=1.1 Cap=20 No LCC
Base Case $ 1,052,650 $ 1,146,207 $ 1,229,680 $ 1,151,422 $ 1,170,426
Best Case $ 1,058,207 $ 1,153,461 $ 1,238,714 $ 1,161,008 $ 1,181,383
Improvement 0.53% 0.63% 0.73% 0.83% 0.94%
Frat5 Sets Yv A,r E,r B,n Y,t
Table 14: Matrices Summary
The improvement in total network revenue in the DF=1.0 case is by 0.63%, which is
higher than the benefits provided by the fare adjustment method alone and slightly
higher and the improvement provided by Q-Forecasting alone. It corresponds to an
increase by 9.3% in the 10 NEM. On Figure 87 is shown the matrix of QF-Frat5 x FA-
Frat5 on which are located the optimums of the different cases.
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Figure 87: Evolution of the Optimal Frat5 Couple with the DF
When demand increases, more and more high-fare passengers are showing-up.
Given that ALl's capacity remains the same, the methods try to be more aggressive
and protect more seats for these passengers relative to the lower classes.
Consequently, we see that from DF=1.1 to DF=1.0 and then to DF=0.9, the
optimum moves toward more aggressive QF-Frat5. The case when the capacity of
the LCC is reduced to 20 seats is, to a certain extent, equivalent from ALl's point of
view, to an increase in demand, and therefore the optimum tends towards less
aggressive Frat5 sets as well (with respect to the DF=1.0 case).
Like in the case of Q-Forecasting, we need a sell-up estimator to be able to use the
Fare Adjustment methods in the real world. The use of both FA and QF Frat5
estimators should bring additional benefits, even if their magnitude may not be as
high as the improvements we obtained with the input Frat5.
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5. Conclusion and Future Research Directions
5.1. Summary of Findings
The objective of this thesis was to explain and measure the performance of two new
alternatives aimed to help airline Revenue Management methods to deal with
unrestricted fare structures and recover from the spiral-down of revenue that
traditional RM methods lead to. We explained the mechanisms of each method, the
way they are linked to each other and why they are complementary and not
redundant. We also described how they are implemented in the Passenger origin
Destination Simulator (PODS) with which the performance measures and analyses
would be done. It was also the goal of the thesis to present diverse analyses
obtained from the simulations results to highlight the mechanisms presented before.
The results of the simulations show that it is possible to partially recover from the
drop caused by the removal of the fare fences in a subset of markets, using either
the Q-Forecasting, the Fare Adjustment method, or better, both simultaneously. The
two methods act at different steps in the process of DAVN; a network Revenue
Management method. The first acts in the forecasting process, addressing the
problem raised by the violation of the fundamental "independence of demand by fare
class" assumption of traditional Revenue Management systems. The second acts
within the booking limit optimizer, introducing the Marginal Revenue as input to the
optimizer instead of the OD fares, accounting for the sell-up probability. Both
methods indeed account for sell-up potential, which is the base for the concepts
presented in this thesis. The thesis shows as well that it is possible to build a sell-up
estimator - in the case of Q-Forecasting - which, based on historical records, can
predict the sell-up rates and can provide satisfying results compared to the version
in which we input the rates.
On Figure 88 is presented a summary of the contributions brought by each method
separately, and then together, assuming in each case the use of the Frat5 set which
led to the highest revenue in its own category. The Frat5 sets are a series of Fare
ratios, relative to the Q fare, at which 50% of passengers are willing to buy a ticket
at a given day of the booking period. They represent the sell-up potential in PODS.
Theses cases correspond to results shown and discussed in this thesis, but it is
interesting to compare them from a broader point of view.
In all cases, we consider AL1 and AL2 using DAVN (Displacement Adjusted Virtual
Nesting), AL3 using AT (Adaptive Threshold, a dynamic version of the Threshold
Revenue Management method) with an 80% load factor target and a demand factor
equal to 1.0. The methods - Q-Forecasting and Fare Adjustment - are used only by
AL1. The following figure reports ALl's revenues, using the methods as indicated on
the X-axis.
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Figure 88: AL1 (DAVN) Revenue in Each Case Using QF and/or FA
The first bar represents the base case, without Q-Forecasting or Fare Adjustment
methods (resulting from the drop in total network revenues by 8% due to the
entrance of a low-cost carrier in the 10 non-stop markets).
The second bar - vertical stripes - corresponds to the case when the airline uses
only Q-Forecasting, with the input Frat5 set "A". In this case, revenues are higher by
0.60% (equals 8.8% revenue increase in the 10 NEM). The improvements obtained
with the sell-up estimator for QF-Frat5 (without FA) were just slightly below this one,
around 0.50%.
The third bar - horizontal stripes - represents the case when the airline uses the
Fare Adjustment method alone, with input Frat5 "k". The benefits in terms of total
network revenue with respect to the base case are by 0.18% (equals 2.6 /o revenue
increase in the 10 NEM).
When both methods are using the same input Frat5 "J" simultaneously - 4 th bar -,
the improvement reaches 0. 4 1% (equals 6 % revenue increase in the 10 NEM).
Finally - last bar - when the airline uses DAVN with both methods and different
Frat5 sets, we obtain the highest improvement in revenue, by 0.63% (for the QF-
Frat5 "A" and the FA-Frat5 "r" - equals 9.2% revenue increase in the 10 NEM).
Even if the improvement difference is not very large between Q-Forecasting alone
and the use of both methods simultaneously (from 0.60% to 0.63%), the second
case actually leads to the highest increase in revenue. Moreover, this configuration
appears to be very stable in terms of sensitivity to Input Frat5, whereas each
methoct used independently was more sensitive.
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Both methods manage - to some extent - to capture more higher-class local
passengers on the 10 legs with unrestricted fare products by closing down earlier the
lower virtual buckets in the DAVN process. Moreover, they lead to network effects by
increasing the number of connecting passengers (given that the Low-Cost Carrier still
captures a significant number of local passengers). Q-Forecasting especially
increased the number of high-class connecting passengers, whereas Fare Adjustment
method increased the loads in all connecting classes.
We have shown in the thesis in detail the mechanisms involved in the different
methods, based on representations of estimated Frat5, adjusted fares, sensitivity
analyses with respect to demand or to input Frat5 sets.
5.2. Future Research Directions
The first suggestion for future research directions is a direct follow-up to this thesis.
The estimation of the various forms of sell-up based on historical data is crucial. It is
indeed the only way for implementing these two alternatives in the actual Revenue
Management Systems used by airline companies in the "real world". We have seen
that the Q-Forecasting Frat5 estimator performs relatively well compared with the Q-
Forecasting input Frat5. An equivalent (in terms of performance as well) is needed
for the estimation of the Fare Adjustment Frat5. This estimator is currently in
development in PODS but it is not yet dramatically competitive with the input Frat5.
The best results are obtained when we combine the 2 methods, so the real world
needs both estimators.
The environments in which we tested the 2 methods bring the second research
direction. It would be indeed interesting to measure the performance of these
methods in fare product structures which are not entirely unrestricted. This
corresponds to cases when a same airline offers some differentiated and some
undifferentiated fare products in the same structure, such as in the US where
"SimpliFares" are now common. In this situation, Q-Forecasting and Fare Adjustment
should be applied to the undifferentiated classes whereas the restricted classes
would be managed by traditional Revenue Management methods.
A parallel direction lies into the more and more obvious segmentation of demand
between product oriented and price-oriented demand. Ideally, one would like to
forecast each type of demand independently, in order to capture the maximum
revenue from the product-oriented demand (by managing them with traditional
revenue Management methods) and then apply the alternative methods presented in
this thesis to the price-oriented method for which the traditional method do not
perform very well. Using either only traditional Revenue Management methods or
only Q-Forecasting and Fare Adjustment methods for both types of demand would
clearly not be optimal. The problem is obviously to properly estimate the demand by
type, and then to be able to offer the proper product to each demand.
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